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ABSTRACT 
A Denial of Service (DoS) occurs when legitimate users are prevented 
from using a service over a computer network. A Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack is a more serious form of DoS in which an attacker uses the 
combined power of many hosts to flood and exhaust the networking or computing 
resources of a target server. In recent years, DDoS attacks have become a major 
threat to both civilian and military networks.  
Multi-Protocol Label Switching with Traffic Engineering (MPLS-TE) is an 
emerging technology that allows explicit, bandwidth-guaranteed packet 
forwarding paths to be established for different traffic flows. It provides a means 
for diverting packets of a suspected DDoS attack for analysis and cleaning 
before forwarding them to the actual destination.  
The objective of this research was to implement and evaluate the 
performance of an MPLS-TE based solution against DDoS attacks on a realistic 
test-bed network consisting of Cisco routers. The test-bed has been integrated 
with Snort®, an open source Intrusion Detection System (IDS), to achieve 
automatic detection and to mitigate DDoS attacks.  The test-bed network was 
subject to a series of malicious traffic flows with varying degrees of intensity. The 
results demonstrated that MPLS-TE is very effective in mitigating such attacks.  
The overall system response time and the router CPU loads are comparable to 
those reported by two former NPS theses that examined alternative solutions 
based on BGP blackhole routing. 
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Denial of Service (DoS) is a common type of cyberattack over the Internet. 
The purpose of DoS is to make a computer’s resources unavailable to its 
intended users. One way to launch a DoS attack is by sending malformed traffic 
to the target or by sending a huge amount of normal traffic which will overload 
the target’s buffer. To be more effective, attackers often use many compromised 
machines, rather than just one, as a source for the attack. In such a case, the 
malicious packets approach the victim from different locations. This special type 
of DoS, called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), is one of the most difficult 
problems affecting normal operations on the Internet. 
The first well-documented DDoS attack occurred in August 1999, when a 
DDoS tool called Trinoo was deployed and activated in at least 227 hosts, 
flooding a single University of Minnesota computer. That computer was down for 
more than two days as a result [1]. 
The biggest DDoS attack in terms of duration, number of victims, and 
caused damage started on February 7, 2000. Yahoo! was one of the first victims 
and the Internet portal was inaccessible by users for three hours. Analysts 
estimated that due to this attack Yahoo suffered a loss of e-commerce and 
advertising revenue amounting to about $500,000. On the same day, CNN, 
eBay, Amazon and Buy.com, were all victims of DDoS attacks, causing them to 
either stop functioning completely or slowing their response times down 
significantly. According to book seller Amazon.com, the attacks resulted in a loss 
of $600,000 during the 10 hours its Web site was down. Buy.com went from 
100% availability to 9.4%, while CNN.com's users went down to below 5% of 
normal volume. And, on February 9, E*Trade and ZDNet both suffered DDoS 
attacks. E*Trade was virtually unreachable. One can only assume that to a 
company that does $2 billion dollars weekly in online trades, the downtime loss 
was huge. 
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Such DDoS attacks are a major concern to the military. A continuous flow 
of information is critical to modern military operations. Additionally, military 
networks are increasingly based on the same technologies used by the public 
Internet, making them susceptible to the same wide range of DDoS threats. 
Several techniques exist to protect a network’s hosts against a DDoS 
attack by filtering out malicious packets. One of the most common is the “Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) Blackhole Routing.”  
Blackhole routing (BHR) is a clever way of implementing the policy “route 
this packet to the trash.” The concept is quite simple and leverages the basic 
operation of routers. A blackhole route tells the router to send the suspected 
packets to the null0 interface (a non-existent interface), which is equivalent to 
telling the router to “route this packet to the trash.”  
In prior efforts, two former NPS students [2] [3] built test-beds to 
investigate how to mitigate DDoS with BGP blackhole routes. In the first one 
(Stamatelatos’ Master’s thesis), the author evaluated the performance of BHR 
methods in the lab with three real-time test-bed networks which were manually 
triggered by the administrator. 
The second one (Puri’s Master’s thesis) used the results from 
Stamatelatos’ study in combination with a proper IDS system and the result was 
a working implementation of a fully automated attack-detect react-protect BHR 
system.  
The problem with BHR is that it protects only the network, not the victim. It 
directs all the traffic - good or bad - to the “trash” and the target cannot receive 
any traffic during the attack. So, good traffic is also sent to the “trash” and thus, 
the DDoS has still achieved its purpose of DoS’ing the target machine. 
This thesis will evaluate another more recently developed technique for 
DDoS mitigation. It is based on MultiProtocol Label Switching – Traffic 
Engineering (MPLS –TE).  
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The MPLS is a connection-oriented forwarding mechanism in which 
packets are forwarded based on labels. It was introduced in 2001 in an attempt 
to create a faster forwarding mechanism to combine the advantages of the 
already existing Internet Protocol (IP) and the Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
(ATM).  
Traffic engineering refers to a mode of network operation whereby routes 
are selected specifically to meet the delay and throughput requirements of 
individual user traffic flows. The MPLS’s support for explicit routing allows 
network engineers to adjust the routing of flows to balance the use of a network’s 
resources and implement traffic engineering solutions. So, MPLS traffic 
engineering (MPLS-TE) provides a way to achieve traffic engineering benefits 
without needing to run a separate network and without needing a non-scalable 
full mesh of router interconnects.  
With MPLS-TE, when an attack is occurring, all traffic destined to the 
victim can be redirected; not sent to the “trash”, but rather to a Cleaning Center 
connected on one of the Label Edge Routers (LERs), as border routers are 
called in MPLS terminology. In this Cleaning Center the traffic will be analyzed 
and “cleaned”; i.e., malicious traffic is sent to the “trash” and the good traffic is 
redirected back to its original destination–the attack’s target.  
The research questions that will be answered by the research for this 
thesis are the following: 
1. What is MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS)? What are the goals 
of MPLS? 
2. How is Traffic Engineering implemented with MPLS? 
3. What are common types of DDoS attacks that can be mitigated by 
the MPLS-TE techniques? 
4. What is the difference between the MPLS-TE technique and the BGP 
Blackholing? 
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5. What is the speed of reaction of the proposed MPLS-TE technique 
to a new DDoS attack? 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents a more 
detailed explanation of DDoS attacks, MPLS-TE, previous studies of DDoS 
mitigation with BGP Blackhole routing  (BHR), methods, and the already existing 
techniques for DDoS mitigation with MPLS-TE. Chapter III describes the 
methodology and the test-bed network configuration used in this research. 
Chapter IV presents the results and analysis of this research and a comparison 
between MPLS-TE and BGP BHR methods. Chapter V provides conclusions and 




A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides background information for this study. The first 
section describes the basic attributes of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks and the most common techniques that attackers use. The second section 
presents the principles of MultiProtocol Label Switching – Traffic Engineering 
(MPLS-TE) forwarding technique. The third section presents the results from 
previous studies related to Boarder Gateway Protocol (BGP) Blackhole routing 
for DDoS attack’s mitigation The fourth section describes the existing methods of 
implementation that have been proposed to protect a network from DDoS attacks 
with the MPS-TE technique. 
B. DISTRIBUTED/DE NIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack can be characterized as an attack on a 
server or a network with the purpose of preventing legitimate users from using 
that server or network. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a large-
scale coordinated DoS attack on the availability of services of a server or 
network, launched indirectly, through many compromised computers on the 
Internet.   The services under attack are those of the “primary victim,” while the 
compromised systems used to launch the attack are often called “Zombies” or 
“secondary victims.”  The use of secondary victims in performing a DDoS attack 
provides the attacker with the ability to perform a much larger and more 
disruptive attack, while making it more difficult to track down the original attacker.  
As defined by the World Wide Web Security FAQ:   
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack uses many 
computers to launch a coordinated DoS attack against one or more 
targets. Using client/server technology, the perpetrator is able to  
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multiply the effectiveness of the Denial of Service significantly by 
harnessing the resources of multiple unwitting accomplice 
computers which serve as attack platforms [4]. 
There are many kinds of DDoS attacks. In general we can divide them into 
four main classes based on how they are engineered: Flood Attacks, 
Amplifications Attacks, Protocol Exploit Attacks and Malformed Packets Attacks 
[5]. 
 
Figure 1.   Architecture of a DDoS Attack (From: [6]) 
1. Flood Attacks  
In Flood Attacks, the attacker uses the Zombies to send large amounts of 
traffic to the victim’s system, in order to congest the victim system’s network 
bandwidth with IP traffic. The system under attack slows down, crashes, or 
suffers, or denies access to legitimate users. Flood attacks can be launched 
using both User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP) packets.[5] 
a. UDP Flood Attack 
In a UDP Flood attack, the attacker sends a large number of UDP 
packets through the Zombies to either random or specified ports on the victim’s 
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system. Often, the attacking DDoS tool will also spoof the source IP address of 
the attacking packets. This helps hide the identity of the secondary victims since 
return packets from the victim’s system are not sent back to the Zombies, but to 
the spoofed addresses.  
The victim’s system tries to process the incoming data to determine 
which applications have requested data. If the victim’s system is not running any 
applications on the targeted port, it will send out an ICMP packet to the sending 
system indicating a “destination port unreachable” message. 
Thus, for a large number of UDP packets, the victimized system will 
be forced into sending many ICMP packets, eventually leading it to be 
unreachable by other clients. A UDP flood attack may also fill the bandwidth of 
connections located around the victim’s system. This often impacts systems 
located near the victim.[5] 
b. ICMP Flood Attack 
In ICMP flood attacks, the attacker sends a large number of  
ICMP_ECHO packets (“ping”) to the victim’s system through the Zombies. These 
packets cause the victim’s system to reply. The combination of inbound and 
outbound traffic saturates the bandwidth of the victim’s network connection [5]. 
Often, the attacking DDoS tool will also spoof the source IP address of the 
attacking packets. This helps hide the identity of the secondary victims since 
return packets from the victim system are not sent back to the Zombies, but to 
the spoofed addresses [5]. 
Due to its simplicity this kind of attack is the chosen attack to be 
contacted during this thesis’ testing. One more reason making this kind of attack 
desirable for examination is that it has been used in previous studies with BGP 
BHR techniques. Since this thesis is going to compare this current technique’s 
performance with the earlier technique, it is very important for both techniques to 
at least be contacted under the same kind of DDoS attack. 
 8
2. Amplification Attacks  
In amplification attacks the attacker spoofs the target’s IP address and he 
or the Zombies send messages to a broadcast IP address, trying to cause all 
systems in the subnet reached by the broadcast address to send a reply to the 
victim’s system. Most routers have the broadcast IP address feature. When a 
sending system specifies a broadcast IP address as the destination address, the 
routers replicate the packet and send it to all the IP addresses within the 
broadcast address range. That is where the attack’s name comes from. The 
broadcast IP address is used to amplify and reflect the attack traffic, and thus 
reduce the victim system’s bandwidth [5]. 
The attacker can send the broadcast message directly, or use the 
Zombies to send the broadcast message to increase the volume of attacking 
traffic. If the attacker decides to send the broadcast message directly, this attack 
provides the attacker with the ability to use the systems within the broadcast 
network as Zombies without needing to gain access to them or to install any 
agent software [5]. 
a. Smurf Attack 
The Smurf attack is named after the source code employed to 
launch the attack (smurf.c) [7]. A Smurf attack uses ICMP_ECHO_REQUEST 
packets with a spoofed source address of the victim. The destination of those 
packets is an IP network broadcast address. When the systems on the network 
(amplifiers) where the broadcast address, the ECHO_REQUEST is sent receive 
the packet with the falsified source address (i.e., the return address), they 
respond, flooding the targeted victim with the echo replies. The amplifier sends 
the ICMP ECHO REQUEST packets to all of the systems within the broadcast 
address range, and each of these systems will return an ICMP ECHO REPLY to 
the target victim’s IP address. This flood can overwhelm the targeted victim’s 
network. Both the intermediate and victim’s networks will see degraded  
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performance. The attack can eventually result in the inoperability of both 
networks. This type of attack amplifies the original packet tens or hundreds of 
times. 
 
Figure 2.   An example of a Smurf attack (After: [2]) 
b. Fraggle Attack 
Another example of amplification attacks is a DDoS Fraggle attack, 
where the attacker sends packets to a network amplifier, using UDP ECHO 
packets instead of ICMP ECHO packets used in Smurf attacks. The result is 
almost the same as with the Smurf attacks [5]. 
3. Protocol Exploit Attacks 
This category of DDoS attacks is based upon IP protocol’s vulnerabilities. 
Two examples are given below. The first one is about misuse of the TCP SYN 
(Transfer Control Protocol Synchronize) protocol, and the second one about the 
misuse of the PUSH+ACK protocol [5]. 
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a. TCP SYN Attack 
The TCP SYN attack exploits the three-way handshake between 
the sender and the receiver by sending a large amount of TCP SYN packets to 
the victim’s system with spoofed source IP addresses, so the victim system 
responds with a SYN+ACK packet to each of them. When the received 
malformed SYN requests are being processed by a server and none of the ACK 
responses are returned, the server eventually runs out of processor and memory 
resources, and becomes unable to respond to legitimate users. Basically, SYN 
flooding disables a targeted system by creating many half-open connections. 
Each operating system has a limit to the number of connections it can accept. In 
addition, the SYN flood may exhaust system memory, resulting in a system 
crash. In a DDoS TCP SYN attack, the attacker uses Zombies to send large 
amount of bogus TCP SYN requests to the victim’s server in order to reserve the 
server’s processor resources, and hence prevent the server from responding to 
legitimate requests. 
b. Push + Ack Attack 
The PUSH + ACK attack is similar to a TCP SYN attack regarding 
its purpose that is to reduce the resources of the victim’s system. In a PUSH + 
ACK attack, the attacker, through the Zombies, sends TCP packets with the 
PUSH and ACK flags (bits) set to one. These flags in the TCP header instruct the 
victim system to empty all data in the TCP buffer (regardless what the buffer 
contains) and send an acknowledgement when complete. If this sequence is 
repeated with multiple Zombies, the receiver cannot process the large amount of 
incoming packets and the victim’s system will run out of resources [8]. 
4. Malformed Packet Attacks 
As S. M. Specht and R. B. Lee stated in their paper: 
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A malformed packet attack is an attack where the attacker instructs 
the zombies to send incorrectly formed IP packets to the victim 
system in order to crash it.  
There are a variety of malformed packet attacks. The most known [9] are: 
Land Attack, Latierra Attack, Ping of Death Attack, Jolt2 Attack, Rose 
Attack, Teardrop, Newtear, Bonk, Syndrop Attack, and Winnuke Attack. 
C. MULTIPROTOCOL LABEL  SWITCHING (MPLS) –  TRAFFI C 
ENGINEERING (TE) 
1. What is MPLS 
In accordance with IEC’s site: 
Multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) is a versatile solution to 
address the problems faced by present-day networks – speed, 
scalability, quality-of-service (QoS) management, and traffic 
engineering. MPLS has emerged as an elegant solution to meet the 
bandwidth-management and service requirements for next-
generation Internet protocol (IP)–based backbone networks. MPLS 
addresses issues related to scalability and routing (based on QoS 
and service quality metrics) and can exist over existing 
asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) and frame-relay networks [10]. 
With an IP forwarding mechanism, packets are sent from a source to a 
destination in a hop-by-hop manner. Intermediate routers examine each packet’s 
header and perform a route table lookup to determine the next hop (i.e., router) 
toward the destination. This may consume a network’s resources because of the 
increased CPU requirements to process each packet’s header. Although modern 
routers use hardware and software switching techniques to manage the headers’ 
examination process by creating high-speed cache entries, these methods rely 
upon the Layer 3 routing protocol to establish the path to the destination.  
The problem with this approach is that routing protocols have little 
knowledge about Layer’s 2 characteristics, such as loading and quality of service 
 12
(QoS). Continuously increased demand for higher quantity and better quality of 
traffic puts demanding pressure on the Internet's backbone.  
To meet these new demands, multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) 
abandoned the hop-by-hop technique by enabling devices to specify paths in the 
network based upon QoS and bandwidth needs of the applications. In other 
words, route selection can now take into account Layer 2’s attributes. Before 
MPLS, vendors implemented other techniques for switching frames with values 
other than the Layer 3 header.  
In 2001, based on Cisco's tag-switching protocol, the IETF defined MPLS 
as a vendor-independent protocol. Although the two protocols have much in 
common, differences between them prevent tag-switching devices from 
interacting directly with MPLS devices. MPLS has now superseded tag switching 
[11]. 
2. How  MPLS Works 
In accordance with Cisco’s Principal Consultant, Cisco Systems-India & 
SAARC, Chandan Mendiratta 
MPLS is a scheme typically used to enhance an IP network. 
Routers on the incoming edge of the MPLS network add an 'MPLS 
label' to the top of each packet. This label is based on some criteria 
(e.g. destination IP address) and is then used to steer it through the 
subsequent routers. The routers on the outgoing edge strip it off 
before final delivery of the original packet. MPLS can be used for 
various benefits such as multiple types of traffic coexisting on the 
same network, ease of traffic management, faster restoration after 
a failure, and, potentially, higher performance. [12] 
So, the main idea is to add a small label (sometimes called a “tag”) on the 
front of a packet and route the packet based on the label, instead of the IP 
address. The MPLS operates at an OSI Model layer that lies between traditional 
definitions of Layer 2 (Data Link Layer) and Layer 3 (Network Layer), and 
therefore is often called the “Layer 2.5” protocol [13]. It provides data-carrying 
service for both circuit-based clients and packet-switching clients which provide a 
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datagram service model. It can be used to carry many different kinds of traffic, 
including IP packets, as well as ATM and Ethernet frames. 
In order to further understand how this protocol works, it is critical for the 
reader to be familiar with the following definitions: 
• Label—A header created by an edge label switch router (edge LSR) and 
used by label switch routers (LSR) to forward packets. The header format varies 
based upon the network media type. For example, in an ATM network, the label 
is placed in the VPI/VCI fields of each ATM cell header. In a LAN environment, 
the header is a “shim” located between the Layer 2 and Layer 3 headers. This 
thesis research is concerned only with IP packets and labels 
 
 
Figure 3.   Shim headers are used for most non-ATM networks (From: [14]) 
• Label Switch Router (LSR)—A device such as a switch or a router that 
forwards labeled entities based upon the label’s value.  
• Label Edge Router (LER) —Resides at the edge of an MPLS network 
and assigns and removes the labels from the packets.  
• Label Sw itched—When an LSR makes a forwarding decision based 
upon the presence of a label in the frame/cell.  
• Label-Switched Path (LSP) —The path defined by the labels through 
LSRs between end points.  
Label : Label value (0 to 15 are reserved for special use) 
QoS  : Quality of Service 
S       : Bottom of Stack (set to 1 for the last entry in the label) 
TTL   : Time To Live 
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• Forward Equivalence Class (FEC)  – A representation of a group of 
packets that share the same requirements for their transport. The assignment of 




Figure 4.   Basics about MPLS (From: [15]) 
As stated on Juniper’s corresponding page “How MPLS Works” [16]: 
MPLS is not a routing protocol; it works with layer 3 routing 
protocols (BGP, IS-IS, OSPF) to integrate network layer routing 
with label switching. An MPLS FEC consists of a set of packets that 
are all forwarded in the same manner by a given label-switching 
router (LSR). For example, all packets received on a particular 
interface might be assigned to a FEC. MPLS assigns each packet 
to a FEC only at the LSR that serves as the ingress node to the 
MPLS domain. A label distribution protocol binds a label to the 
FEC. Each LSR uses the label distribution protocol to signal its 
forwarding peers and distribute its labels to establish an LSP. The 
label distribution protocol enables negotiation with the downstream 




Labels represent the FEC along the LSP from the ingress node to 
the egress node. The label is prepended to the packet when the 
packet is forwarded to the next hop. Each label is valid only 
between a pair of LSRs. A downstream LSR reached by a packet 
uses the label as an index into a table that contains both the next 
hop and a different label to prepend to the packet before 
forwarding.  
The above section closes as follows [16]: 
The LSR that serves as the egress MPLS node uses the label as 
an index into a table that has the information necessary to forward 
the packet from the MPLS domain. The forwarding actions at the 
egress LSR can be any of the following: 
Forward the packet based on the inner header exposed after 
popping the label. This can be accomplished either by doing a 
routing table lookup or forwarding based on the exposed inner 
MPLS label.  
Forward the packet to a particular neighbor as directed by the table 
entry, for example in a Martini layer 2 transport case.  
 Each LSR, also known as an MPLS node, must support the following [16]. 
• At least one Layer 3 routing protocol (IS-IS, OSPF or BGP) 
• A label distribution protocol (LDP, BGP, or RSVP-TE) 
• The ability to forward packets based on their labels  
An LSP with MPLS can be defined either by hop-by-hop routing (where 
each LSR independently selects the next hop for a given FEC), or by explicit 
routing (similar to source routing – the ingress LSR specifies the list of nodes 
through which the packet traverses (Traffic Engineering). The LSP setup for an 
FEC is unidirectional. The return traffic must use another LSP (may be the same 
if defined so) [16]. 
When an MPLS network has been set up, the routing protocol (OSPF, 
BGP or IS-IS) is used to specify how routers can communicate with each other 
with the routing update messages.  
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Figure 5.   A MPLS network example: Exchange routing information (From: [17]) 
Sequentially, the selected label distribution protocol (LDP, BGP or RSVP-
TE) is used to assign the corresponding labels.  
 
Figure 6.   A MPLS network example: Assigning Labels (From: [17]) 
After the label assignment, the MPLS network is ready to forward packets 
as already described. 
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Figure 7.   A MPLS network example: Forwarding packets (From: [17]) 
3. Label Distribution  
There are three methods for label distribution. The first one is the Label 
Distribution Protocol (LDP). This LDP is used between nodes in an MPLS 
network to establish and maintain the label bindings. In order for MPLS to 
operate correctly, label distribution information needs to be transmitted reliably, 
and the label distribution protocol messages pertaining to a particular FEC need 
to be transmitted in sequence. Flow control is also desirable, as is the capability 
to carry multiple label messages in a single datagram. 
As described on protocols.com “MPLS” web page [18], the LSR uses LDP 
in order 
…to establish label switched paths through a network by mapping 
network layer routing information directly to data-link layer switched 
paths. These LSPs may have an endpoint at a directly attached 
neighbor (like IP hop-by-hop forwarding), or may have an endpoint 
at a network egress node, enabling switching via all intermediary 
nodes. A FEC (Forwarding Equivalence Class) is associated with 
each LSP created. This FEC specifies which packets are mapped 
to that LSP. 
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The second method is with RSVP, which is used in MPLS traffic 
engineering. This method employs additions to the RSVP signaling protocol. It 
leverages the admission control mechanism of RSVP. Label requests are sent in 
PATH messages and binding is done with RESV messages. An EXPLICIT-
ROUTE object defines the path over which setup messages should be routed. 
Using RSVP has several advantages [17]. 
The advantages of using RSVP with MPLS and how it works are very well 
described in protocols.com web page [18] as follows: 
The RSVP protocol defines a session as a data flow with a 
particular destination and transport-layer protocol. However, when 
RSVP and MPLS are combined, a flow or session can be defined 
with greater flexibility and generality. The ingress node of an LSP 
(Label Switched Path) uses a number of methods to determine 
which packets are assigned a particular label. Once a label is 
assigned to a set of packets, the label effectively defines the flow 
through the LSP. We refer to such an LSP as an LSP tunnel 
because the traffic through it is opaque to intermediate nodes along 
the label switched path.  
The last method for label distribution is the BGP-Based Label Distribution, 
which is used in the context of MPLS VPNs. Since VPNs have nothing to do with 
this research effort this last method is not addressed further in this thesis. 
4. What is MPLS-TE 
In accordance with Wikipedia, Teletraffic or Traffic Engineering is:  
…the application of traffic engineering theory to 
telecommunications. Teletraffic engineers use their basic 
knowledge of statistics including Queueing theory, the nature of 
traffic, their practical models, their measurements and simulations 
to make predictions and to plan telecommunication networks at 
minimum total cost. These tools and basic knowledge help provide 
reliable service at lower cost. [19] 
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The MPLS-TE software allows an MPLS backbone to simulate and 
expand upon the traffic engineering capabilities of Layer 2 Frame Relay networks 
and ATM [20]. 
As is referred to on Cisco’s MPLS-TE web page [20]: 
Traffic engineering is essential for service provider and Internet 
service provider (ISP) backbones. Such backbones must support a 
high use of transmission capacity, and the networks must be very 
resilient, so that they can withstand link or node failures.  
MPLS traffic engineering provides an integrated approach to traffic 
engineering. With MPLS, traffic engineering capabilities are 
integrated into Layer 3, which optimizes the routing of IP traffic, 
given the constraints imposed by backbone capacity and topology.  
MPLS traffic engineering routes traffic flows across a network 
based on the resources the traffic flow requires and the resources 
available in the network.  
MPLS traffic engineering employs "constraint-based routing," in 
which the path for a traffic flow is the shortest path that meets the 
resource requirements (constraints) of the traffic flow. In MPLS 
traffic engineering, the flow has bandwidth requirements, media 
requirements, a priority versus other flows, and so on.  
MPLS traffic engineering gracefully recovers to link or node failures 
that change the topology of the backbone by adapting to the new 
set of constraints. 
5. How  MPLS-TE Works 
As has already been discussed, MPLS can be considered an integration 
of Layer 2 and Layer 3 technologies. The MPLS enables traffic engineering by 
making traditional Layer 2 features available (or “visible”) to Layer 3. Thus, 
vendors can provide in a one-tier network that traditional techniques could only 
achieve by overlaying a Layer 3 network on a Layer 2 network [20].  
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As stated on Cisco’s corresponding web page [20]: 
MPLS traffic engineering automatically establishes and maintains 
the tunnel across the backbone, using RSVP. The path used by a 
given tunnel at any point in time is determined based on the tunnel 
resource requirements and network resources, such as bandwidth. 
Available resources are flooded via extensions to a link-state based 
Interior Protocol Gateway (IPG). Tunnel paths are calculated at the 
tunnel head based on a fit between required and available 
resources (constraint-based routing). The IGP automatically routes 
the traffic into these tunnels. Typically, a packet crossing the MPLS 
traffic engineering backbone travels on a single tunnel that 
connects the ingress point to the egress point.  
A tunnel is a path that can either be:  
• explicitly configured hop-by-hop, 
• dynamically routed by the Constrained Shortest Path First (CSPF) 
algorithm, or  
• configured as a loose route that avoids a particular IP or that is 
partly explicit and partly dynamic.  
In order to achieve MPLS-TE, the engaged routers should support the 
following mechanisms, as they are defined on Cisco’s site [20]: 
• Label-switched path (LSP) tunnels, are signaled through RSVP, 
with traffic engineering extensions. The LSP tunnels are represented as tunnel 
interfaces. Tunnels have a preconfigured destination, and they are unidirectional. 
This last issue means that a return tunnel must be established if full duplex 
communication is desired. 
• A link-state IGP (such as OSPF) with extensions for the global 
flooding of resource information, and extensions for the automatic routing of 
traffic onto LSP tunnels must be selected as appropriate. 
• An MPLS-TE path calculation module determines paths to use for 
LSP tunnels. This is not necessary if the tunnel configuration is manually created, 
such as in a LAN or small WAN. 
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• An MPLS-TE link management module that does link admission 
and bookkeeping of the resource information to be flooded. 
• Label switching forwarding, provides routers with a Layer 2-like 
ability to direct traffic across multiple hops as directed by the resource-based 
routing algorithm. 
A method to implement MPLS-TE is described on Cisco’s site [20] as 
follows:  
One approach to engineer a backbone is to define a mesh of 
tunnels from every ingress device to every egress device. The IGP, 
operating at an ingress device, determines which traffic should go 
to which egress device, and steers that traffic into the tunnel from 
ingress to egress. The MPLS traffic engineering path calculation 
and signaling modules determine the path taken by the LSP tunnel, 
subject to resource availability and the dynamic state of the 
network. For each tunnel, counts of packets and bytes sent are 
kept. Sometimes, a flow is so large that it cannot fit over a single 
link, so it cannot be carried by a single tunnel. In this case multiple 
tunnels between a given ingress and egress can be configured, and 
the flow is load shared among them. [20] 
D. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF BGP BLACKHOLE ROUTING (BGP BHR) 
There have been a few studies carried out that talk about the analysis of 
DDoS mitigation with BGP BHR. The most complete and analytical is N. 
Stamatelatos’ thesis, A Measurement Study of BGP Blackhole Routing 
Performance.[2] There is also a second study, V. Puri’s Automated Alerting for 
Blackhole Routing,[3] which extends the research done by N. Stamatelatos’ 
thesis. 
Stamatelatos used a real test-bed network to evaluate the effectiveness of 
various methods of BHR. The performance metric chosen by Stamatelatos was 
router response time, router CPU load, and link load. He stress-tested three 
implementations of the BHR concept in a lab environment.  
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In Stamatelatos’ study, a given DDoS attack had been positively identified 
by either an automated system or a human operator. The author recognized, in 
the “Future Work” section, [2] that the ability to automatically identify an attack 
using an IDS/IPS system would greatly improve the performance of BGP BHR 
and suggested the research in this field as an area for future work. 
This suggested work is what Puri’s thesis centered on. Puri managed not 
only to select and configure an appropriate IDS to detect a distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attack; but to also integrate this detection capability into an 
enhanced BHR system, by having the IDS directly cue the “trigger router” that 
sends the null—blackhole—route update to all border routers. The result is a 
working implementation of a fully automated attack-detect-react-protect BHR 
system. 
1. How BGP BHR Works 
A BGP BHR system is one mechanism used to mitigate DDoS attacks. It 
uses a feature of almost all existing routers, the Null0 interface, in combination 
with the BGP routing protocol in order to drop undesired packets destined to a 
specific host. 
The Null0 is a pseudo-interface that every router has by default. It is 
always up but can never actually forward or receive traffic. Whenever a packet is 
routed to Null0, it will be dropped. The purpose of the interface is to discard 
unwanted traffic.  
The configuration for applying BHR is relatively simple. The basic 
requirement is a static route of the destination IP address to be discarded. This 
configuration for Cisco routers is shown in Stamatelatos’ thesis as: 
interface  Null0 
no  icmp  unreachables 
ip  route  127.0.0.0  255.0.0.0  null  0 
Traffic is sent to the Null0 interface, and since there is no real host to 
receive the packets, ICMP Unreachable replies are submitted by default. To 
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prevent this unnecessary traffic, the first two lines from the previous 
configuration’s example are used. The lines first specify the interface and then 
configure the router to not create ICMP Unreachable replies for this interface. 
The third line is the static route. In the above example, the packets that have as 
their destination the subnet 127.0.0.0/8 will be forwarded to the Null0 interface.  
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the most popular routing protocol 
used between Autonomous Systems (AS). It is very powerful and gives network 
administrators many options in applying routing policies. When used inside an 
AS, it is called an internal BGP (iBGP). Routers that speak BGP establish a TCP 
connection between themselves, so that the exchange of information is reliable. 
In BGP BHR, blocking malicious traffic is tried as early as possible. The 
most proper place to block malicious traffic is at the border routers where the 
traffic enters the network. By discarding traffic at that point, the network is 
protected, since no undesired traffic travels inside the AS. The basic 
implementation of BGP BHR requires a pre-configuration of all border routers 
with a static route entry to the Null0 interface. A router inside the AS is also 
configured to work as a trigger; it communicates with the border routers using 
iBGP.  
To apply BHR, a special static route to the IP address of the victim needs 
to be added to the routing table of the trigger router. The static route contains 
more information under a “tag.” Among this information, the most important is the 
“next-hop,” which for BHR needs to be an IP address from the private subnet IP 
addresses already configured at the border routers. The trigger will automatically 
advertise the static route to the border routers, using an iBGP route update 
advertisement, and the border routers will update their routing table with the new 
entry, forcing all traffic destined to the victim to be routed to their null interface. 
To stop BHR, the static route at the trigger router is removed and the router will 
send out a route withdrawal to all border routers, again via iBGP. 
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The BGP BHR is not a perfect defense against DDoS attacks. Its most 
significant limitation is that it blocks traffic based only on an IP address. It cannot 
be more discrete in its filtering, for example, by dropping only telnet or HTTP 
packets going to the victim. Another drawback is that it is very hard to bypass or 
provide exceptions to the filtering, since to do so the router’s forwarding table has 
to be bypassed.  
There are many variations to the basic Blackhole routing technique, all of 
which can be categorized as one of two basic implementations: the Remote-
Triggered (RTBH) and the Customer-Triggered. The main distinction between the 
two is the origination of the filtering command. The RTBH routing can be further 
divided into either destination-based routing or source-based routing, depending 
on what information (the source or the destination IP address) is used to block 
traffic. 
The following sub-sections briefly discuss the network setup followed for 
both previous researches.  
2. Lab Setup/Test Bed 
a. Lab Setup in Stamatelatos’ Research 
Stamatelatos evaluated the performance of BHR methods in the lab 
with three real-time test-bed networks. He selected seven routers to simulate the 
various environments that depict the real-time AS. Stamatelatos utilized his 
chosen performance metrics in his test beds. A brief discussion of the three test-
bed networks he used is as follows: 
(1) Test-Bed Network #1. The main task of this test-bed network 
was to evaluate the performance of both the methods of remote-triggered BHR, 
i.e., destination-based and source-based. Stamatelatos simulated an AS 
environment with three border routers, two internal routers, and one trigger 
router. In this test bed, malicious traffic would approach the AS from different 
sources. In addition, traffic would also traverse through different border routers. 
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Once the attack began, the trigger router inside the AS was configured to 
advertise either source-based or destination-based BHR to evaluate both the 
techniques. 
(2) Test-Bed Network #2. The main purpose of test-bed network #2 
was to evaluate customer-triggered BHR and then compare its performance with 
remote-triggered BHR. Stamatelatos simulated this test bed by maintaining the 
same topology as discussed in test-bed network #1. The only difference was the 
positioning of the trigger router. The trigger router was placed in line with the 
target-host to simulate the customer network. 
(3) Test-Bed Network #3. The purpose of test-bed network #3 was 
to evaluate the performance of BGP BHR in a network where the routers have 
sufficient CPU capacity but some of the internal links of the victim’s network 
become congested during an attack. The researcher simulated this to evaluate 
performance when the limiting factor could be the link load, not the router CPU 
load. He utilized five routers, one of which is Juniper router with a relatively high 
CPU capacity, to simulate this test bed. The topology was different from test-bed 
networks #1 and #2. 
 
Figure 8.   Stamatelatos’ topology for test-bed #3 (From: [2]) 
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b. Lab Setup in Puri’s Research 
Since Puri’s work continued Stamatelatos’ study, he had to select 
one of the above test-beds and techniques. He finally chose to work with the 
customer-triggered BHR technique.  
He used a test-bed close to Stamatelatos’ test-Bed Network #3, but 
simplified. More specifically he used two instead of three border routers for his 
AS. Instead of that, the rest of the components were placed by using almost 
identical topology.  
 
 
Figure 9.   Puri’s test-bed (From: [3]) 
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3. Research Conclusions 
a. Stamatelatos’ Research Conclusions 
• Resource overload may disrupt the BGP session between the 
trigger router and a border router and thus degrade the performance of BGP 
BHR. 
• Customer-triggered BHR is not as effective as other techniques. 
• Destination-based BHR performed best in test-bed simulations. 
• The BHR would be totally inefficient if applied 40 seconds or more 
after the DDoS attack initialization (especially with high link load). 
b. Puri’s Research Conclusions 
• The BHR proved to be one of the fastest ways to mitigate DDoS 
attacks on the network. Once an attack was detected, the system mitigated the 
DDoS attack in close to 20 seconds.  
• The automation of BHR is not only an adaptable and useful 
technique, but it is also an efficacious and productive technique to mitigate DDoS 
attacks. 
• Though BHR cannot be the sole solution to mitigate a D/DoS 
attack, it is recommended that the BHR solution be one of the mechanisms 
available to safeguard the target(s) and network resources from annoying D/DoS 
traffic within an AS. 
4. Comments on Prior BGP BHR Work 
Stamatelatos’ thesis was focused on the BGP BHR performance by 
assuming that a DDoS attack had previously been recognized. Hence, the first 
shortcoming of his study was the absence of IDS.  
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Another shortcoming was the absence of automation. He manually added 
the static route to the trigger router to advertise the null route. When a network is 
under attack, time is critical. By manually typing a command of 35 characters 
extra delay time to the system’s response is added, no matter how quickly one 
can type. If the time needed to connect with the server via telnet is also added, 
this approach proves to be unrealistic for real world systems. 
Another major shortcoming in that research was in its conclusion. 
Stamatelatos concluded that customer-triggered BHR is least effective. He did 
not explore how this technique could be effective.  
Puri’s thesis actually extended Stamatelatos’s work and addressed the 
issues that Stamatelatos’ thesis had. At the beginning an IDS (Snort®) was 
employed in order overcome the first shortcoming as stated above in this 
paragraph. Second, he added automation (SnortSam) in order to add the static 
route to the trigger router to advertise the null route. He also used customer-
triggered BHR and he proved that this technique is as effective as the remote 
triggered is.  
Even if Puri had managed to overcome the major disadvantages that 
Stamatelatos’ approach had, both of those studies still have not overcome the 
significant disadvantages that the BGP BHR technique has. The main 
disadvantages are: 
• All the traffic flow, malicious or not, from each edge router is 
discarded during the attack. In other words, the attacker ultimately still wins. The 
victim server is no longer reachable from any other AS and so there is a Denial of 
Service. 
• Which router to block or not cannot be determined, thus all routers 
have to be blocked, including those that are connected to a secure network. 
• The discarded traffic is lost forever. It cannot be analyzed and 
perhaps “cleaned” in a dedicated place.  
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• A false positive response would result in a self-inflicted DoS attack. 
• The response time of 20 seconds is acceptable within a relatively 
small network, but for a wide AS better performance has to be achieved. 
These shortcomings have been overcome in this thesis research by 
engaging the MPLS-TE technique in combination with the services of IDS and 
the automated process of route advertisement that Puri used in his work. 
E. EXISTING MPLS-TE TECHNIQUES FOR DDOS MITIGATION 
Although it has great advantages, only two proposed techniques were 
found in the literature about the usage of MPLS-TE for DDoS mitigation.  
1. MPLS-based Traffic Shunt 
The first of them was presented during the 28th North American Networks 
Operators’ Group’s (NANOG) meeting in June 2003 in Salt Lake City, Utah [21]. 
The working team consisted of Yehuda Afek from Riverhead Networks, Roy 
Brooks from Cisco Systems and Nicolas Fischbach from COLT Telecom. The 
last participant presented the same work in September of the same year during 
the 46th Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Center’s (RIPE NCC) 
meeting in Amsterdam, Netherlands [22].  
The title of their work was “MPLS-based Traffic Shunt.” With their 
presentation they proposed a new protecting method against DDoS by the usage 
of MPLS benefits in combination with the establishment of an “Inspection 
Device.” The Inspection Device is actually a sinkhole router with a sinkhole 
server. A sinkhole router does exactly what a border router does when BGP BHR 
is used. The difference is that in this case and after the attack’s detection a static 
route on a preselected core router (sinkhole router) is added which sends all the 
traffic destined for the victim to a dedicated interface as the Null0 in the BGP 
BHR method. This time, however, the BGP advertises that the victim is now 
connected on the sinkhole router. The sinkhole routing method adds an overload 
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to the network, since it carries all the malicious traffic through the network, but it 




Figure 10.   DDoS mitigation with the Sinkhole router technique (After: [21]) 
They proved that the sinkhole technique combined with traffic engineering 
techniques could provide a new capability. They could redirect the inspected and 
cleaned traffic back to the victim through the same network. With this new 
capability the network completely addresses the DDoS attack. Specifically, the 
MPLS-based traffic shunt has the following advantages [22] against the sinkhole 
method: 
61.1.1.1
Sink hole server 
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a. The MPLS-based method is bi-directional, which means legal traffic 
can be sent back to the target, losing only a small amount of non-malicious 
packets during the attack instead of all of them. 
b. Since it used preconfigured tunnels, it does not add any overhead 
to the routers. The sinkhole routing without MPLS is based on IP techniques 
which add more routing complexity. 
c. No additional software or hardware is required, since the routers 
employed already support MPLS. 
In order to achieve their configuration, the team proposed the employment 
of tunnels from the peering/upstream routers to the inspection device and from 
the inspection device to the end system. They provided the following limitations 
[22] that this technique implies: 
• Careful setup is required to avoid loops. 
• Returned traffic must not pass through a peering router. 
• Processing overhead for the sinkhole server is added. 
They introduced two different methods to implement their MPLS-based 
traffic shunt. The first one was with pure MPLS using proxy LSP, which is going 
to be implemented in this thesis work, along with iBGP routing protocol in 
correspondence with the IP-based sinkhole technique described previously in 
this section. The main difference is that now the sinkhole server will be replaced 
by a “Cleaning Center” which has the capability to clean the traffic, drop the 
malicious packets and redirect the clean packets to their original destinations 
using the MPLS-TE attributes. 
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Figure 11.   DDoS mitigation with the MPLS-based traffic shunt technique (After: 
[21]) 
The second proposed method from this first team was MPLS Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs) using Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF), which 
actually is not a traffic engineering technique, and thus is out of the scope of the 
research for this thesis. 
This author could not find any official report about the above methods, 
except for a power point file from their presentations at NANOG28 and RIPE46, 
even if after contact with the authors. So, there is no information as to how they 
achieved the attack detection, in other words, what IDS they used, or what kind 
of automation they used to trigger their sinkhole router.  
At their presentations’ conclusions [22] they stated that their techniques 
were: 
Returned traffic must not 
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• Actually deployed, not only in the lab. 
• Proved easy to deploy, maintain and use. 
• Improved DDoS detection, mitigation and analysis/post-mortem in 
conjunction with Netflowbased detection solution and customer profiling (filtering 
templates). 
2. Sinkhole Routing with BGP Group Attributes 
The second MPLS-TE technique found in the literature for DDoS 
mitigation was issued as a white paper in January 2007 by Huawei Technologies 
Co. Ltd. with the title “Technical White Paper for Sinkhole Routing”.[23] 
The authors here used also the already shown sinkhole router method, but 
this time they went one step further. They focused on the usage of the group 
attributes of BGP routing protocol in order to achieve great scalability in their 
solution. They confirm in their paper that with their configuration, based on the 
BGP group attributes, they can achieve better performance of the protecting 
system.  
This solution needs to assign a special group attribute value to all area 
border routers that may lead attacks in the ISP autonomous area in advance. 
With this technique, each border router is assigned a specific group attribute 
value. If a received route update report carries special group attributes assigned 
to this router or group attributes specifying all border routers, it will change the 
next hop attribute into the network segment address of a specific RFC 1918. So, 
traffic can be redirected only from attacked border routers and not from all of 
them. As a result, legal traffic on the routers not attacked will access the attacked 
host along a normal path, but the area border router of the attack entrance will 
block illegal traffic to reduce attack influence. At the same time since the route 
information of the core route remains unchanged, the access from the inside of 
the ISP to the objective host will not be affected. 
 34
With this solution they reduced the processing overhead of the sinkhole 
router and server (cleaning center). The proposed technique is actually an 
improved version of the above MPLS-based traffic shunt [21] technique.  
The Huawei paper [23] does not make any reference to how to configure 
the MPLS-TE, the used security analysis/record facilities and the way the 
automated response can be achieved. Instead of that, they provide an example 
which gives the reader an abstract idea of how the techniques should be 
configured and should react as in the following figures. 
 
 




















Figure 13.   Lead all traffic to server A to the sinkhole router to make traffic of other 
servers normal. (From: [23]) 
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Figure 14.   R3 releases a route again and the route of R2 at the non-attack 
entrance becomes normal.(From: [23]) 
In their summary part of the paper the authors conclude that the sinkhole 
routing technology combined with the enhanced BHR technology triggered by the 
BGP can reduce the DDoS’s attack damage. They continued by stating that 
when this solution is integrated, in parallel with the ACL technology, the results 
are reduced network workload and better analyzed traffic.  
3. Comments on Prior MPLS-TE Work 
The above techniques are based on the same idea of sinkhole routing. 
The second idea can be seen as an improved version of the first. Both use BGP 
routing protocol to force the edge routers to redirect the traffic destined to the 
victim at the sinkhole router. After this point, the already preconfigured tunnels 
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route the traffic to the sinkhole router. This approach implies an extra overload to 
the routers and increases the response time. In both proposals, there is a lack of 
real world results and there is no reference to the techniques’ performance. In 
the first approach a reference to an actual deployment is done, but no other 
details are provided. Both of the works claim that better results were achieved, 
but they do not provide any evidence, or any comparison with the previous 
techniques. 
The technique used in this current study borrowed the sinkhole routing 
idea in combination with the MPLS-TE, as in the previous two techniques. The 
main difference is that this research did not use BGP protocol. The installed 
routing protocol was OSPF and the redirection of the traffic to the sinkhole router 
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III. SETUP OF TEST-BED 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the laboratory set-up of the MPLS-TE network 
used for this thesis research. Section B presents the overall network architecture 
of the MPLS-TE laboratory setup and the basic configuration for the LER and 
LSR routers. This is followed by a detailed description of the various parameters 
of interest and the required hardware and software configuration for evaluating 
the effectiveness of an MPLS-TE based solution against DDoS attacks. The last 
Section describes the software tools used to detect a DDoS attack and trigger an 
automated response against the attack. 
B. NETWORK’S CONFIGURATION 
1. General 
For a fair comparison with previous BGP BHR studies, the author chose to 
build a test-bed close to that used by Puri. The main difference in this current 
test-bed is the packet routing technique which, in this case, is MPLS-TE over IP 
instead of plain IP. For the same reason, the author elected to use identical or 
newer versions of the software in Puri’s attack detection and response system. 
2. Hard ware 
The following devices are used for this research test bed network: 
• Four Cisco routers with IOS C3620 software, Versions 12.2(17a), 
12.2(24a), 12.2(29) and 12.2(3) with four 10 Mbps Ethernet 
Interfaces, used as Border Routers. 
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• One Cisco router with IOS 3600 software, Version 12.2(3) with four 
10 Mbps Ethernet Interfaces and one 100 Mbps Fast Ethernet 
Interface used as an internal router. 
• One Smart Bits 6000C Performance Analysis System of Spirent, for 
packets’ generation. 
• Three desktop PCs with Windows XP SP 2. One is used for Smart 
Bits’ and routers’ configuration. The second one as an attack 
monitor connected with LER2. The third one is used as a target 
machine. 
• One desktop PC with Fedora 8.0 is loaded on with the IDS. 
• One LAN-3321A TeraMetrics XD module with two 10/100/1000 
Mbps Ethernet Copper ports and two 1 Gigabit Ethernet Fiber ports 
installed on the Smart Bits 6000C system. Both the copper ports 
are used to simulate a D/DoS attack. 
• One Hub used to create a subnetwork between the IDS’s and the 
target’s machines. 
3. Sofw are 
The applications used for this research are as follows: 
Smart Window version 7.70.128, for use with the Smart Bits 6000C 
system to generate attack traffic. 
CommView version 6.0 of Tamosoft, for crafting custom ICMP packets. 
Wireshark version 1.0.0 and 1.0.3 Network Protocol Analyzer on Windows 
XP machines. 
Wireshark version 1.0.3 Network Protocol Analyzer on Linux 2.6.26.5-
28.fc8 for monitoring the target network traffic. 
Snort® version 2.6.1.3 as the Intrusion Detection System (IDS). 
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SnortSam added as a plugin program to the Snort® package in order to 
achieve automated detection of and response to the attack. 
4. Topology and MPLS Tunnels 
The following figure shows the implementation of the MPLS-TE network 
set-up in the laboratory. The MPLS-TE network is formed by five routers. One 
LSR router performs label switching and emulates the core of an MPLS network 
backbone. Four LER routers are entry and exit points to the network. Each LER 
router is directly connected to the LSR router. The LER2 and LER3 routers are 
connected, also, to the Smart Bits 6000C through its LAN-3321A TeraMetrics XD 
Ethernet Copper ports. The DDoS attacks are launched from those two points. 
The LER4 is connected with the target’s sub-network. The target’s sub-network 
includes one Windows XP desktop, acting as the target host, and another Fedora 
Linux machine, acting as the IDS/automation system. Both of those machines 
are connected through a HUB to the LER4. Finally, LER1 is connected with a 
Windows XP desktop, which simulates the cleaning center. 
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Figure 15.   Network topology 
Nine MPLS tunnels have been preconfigured with MPLS-TE parameters 





Tunnel From To Bandwidth 
10 LER3 LER4 4800 kbps 
11 LER3 LER1 4800 kbps 
12 LER2 LER1 4800 kbps 
13 LER2 LER4 4800 kbps 
14 LER4 LER1 100 kbps 
15 LER4 LER2 4800 kbps 
16 LER4 LER3 4800 kbps 
17 LER1 LER2 4800 kbps 
18 LER1 LER3 4800 kbps 
19 LER1 LER4 100 kbps 
Table 1.   Preconfigured MPLS-TE tunnels 
The purpose of tunnels 11 and 12 is to divert the attack packets from their 
ingress routers to the cleaning center. The rest of the tunnels are used for normal 
traffic. 
When an attack is detected by the IDS installed on the Fedora machine, 
the plug-in program to the IDS is activated and starts a telnet session at the 
beginning with the cleaning center’s LER router – LER1 – and adds a static route 
as follows: 
ip route 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.255 interface ethernet1/0 
Sequentially, it starts telnet sessions with LER2 and LER3 – one at a time 
– and adds the following static routes:  
ip route 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.255 interface Tunnel12  on 
LER2 and, ip route 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.255 interface 
Tunnel11  on LER3. The ip address 192.168.3.1, was added earlier as a 
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second ip address, on the ”clean center” machine connected on interface 
Ethernet 1/0 of LER1. Consequently, LER2 and LER3 will forward all traffic 
destined to the target host for the cleaning center. From this point forward the 
DDoS attack can no longer impact the target host, similar to what happens when 
using BGP BHR methods. However, this technique provides one significant 
advantage. The traffic from the edge routers is not simply discarded. It is directed 
to the cleaning center, where it can be analyzed and cleaned and the legal part 
of it can be redirected back to the attacked machine through the same MPLS-TE 
network used during the attack. 
5. Router Configuration (Edge, Core) 
This Section shows the configurations required to set up the LER and LSR 
routers for the MPLS-TE test-bed. The configuration files for the rest of routers in 
the test-bed are presented in Appendix A. 
a. Installing LER Router 
The four LER routers are Cisco 3620 routers running the Cisco 
Internetworking Operating System (IOS) version 12.2. The connection between 
the LER routers and the LSR router are established using Ethernet interfaces. 
Table 2 shows the MPLS-TE configuration for one of the LER routers – LER2. 
 
Configuration of LER router – LER2 
Current configuration : 1872 bytes 
! 
version 12.2 
service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log uptime 






















 ip address 192.168.10.4 255.255.255.255 
! 
interface Tunnel12 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.5 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name sec-LSR1 
! 
interface Tunnel13 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.2 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER4 
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 




 description Connection to LSR1 
 ip address 192.168.4.128 255.255.255.0 
 half-duplex 
 mpls traffic-eng tunnels 
 tag-switching ip 
 priority-group 1 
 ip rsvp bandwidth 10000 10000 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 









router ospf 99 
 router-id 192.168.10.4 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
 mpls traffic-eng router-id Loopback0 
 mpls traffic-eng area 0 
! 
ip classless 
no ip http server 
! 
ip explicit-path name sec-LSR1 enable 
 next-address 192.168.4.1 
 next-address 192.168.7.128 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER4 enable 
 next-address 192.168.4.1 
 next-address 192.168.6.128 
! 
priority-list 1 protocol ip high tcp telnet 
priority-list 1 protocol ip low 
! 
! 





line con 0 
 password vordos 
 login 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 




Table 2.   MPLS-TE Configuration of LER Router – LER2 
The “tag-switching ip” command in the router configuration enables 
MPLS for a network interface. It is an alternative to the “mpls ip” command 
available in newer Cisco IOS versions. In the sample configuration above, the 
“tag-switching ip” command is used for the network interface connecting to 
the LSR router.  
As stated in the Background chapter each MPLS-TE router should use at 
least one layer three routing protocol of the Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) type. 
The most commonly adopted IGPs for MPLS-TE are OSPF and IS-IS (link state 
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protocols) in MPLS configurations as they are the only two IGPs that support 
MPLS traffic engineering. The IS-IS uses new Type-Length-Values (TLVs); 
OSPF uses type 10 Link-State Advertisements (also called Opaque LSAs).[24] 
There is no strong reason to use one IGP over the other for the laboratory set-up. 
The OSPF is the author’s selection for the configuration presented above. The 
next step is to enable the routing protocol (OSPF) to operate in the MPLS-TE 
environment by entering the commands “mpls traffic-eng router-id 
Loopback0” and “mpls traffic-eng area 0.” 
In order to enable the MPLS-TE features of this test-bed, the command 
“mpls traffic-eng tunnel” shown in Table 2 is used. A tunnel’s 
configuration starts with the command “interface TunnelX,” where X is the 
tunnel’s number. Subsequently, the tunnel’s destination must be specified with 
the command “tunnel destination XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX,” where the ip 
address is the destination LER’s Loopback0 address. In order to enable the 
ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) the command “ip rsvp bandwidth 10000” is 
entered on each concerned interface for non-zero bandwidth tunnels.  
Then, the tunnels to be used for TE are set up. There are many options 
that can be configured for an MPLS TE tunnel, but the command “tunnel mode 
mpls traffic-eng” is mandatory. The “tunnel mpls traffic-eng 
autoroute announce” command met on this configuration announces the 
presence of the tunnel by the routing protocol. The priority of the tunnels has 
been set to 7, which is the highest possible value and corresponds to the lowest 
forwarding priority. The bandwidth is mostly specified to 4800 kbps with the 
command “tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800.” Only two 
tunnels have a different bandwidth of 100 kbps. They are used to connect the 
target’s LER – LER4 and the cleaning center’s LER – LER1, and hence, a 
smaller bandwidth is sufficient. 
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We define the name of the explicit route i.e., “def-LER4” with the 
command “tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name 
def-LER4.” 
As can be seen in the above configuration, each tunnel is considered as a 
router’s interface. The “ip unnumbered Loopback0” configuration command 
allows enabling IP processing on a serial interface without assigning it an explicit 
IP address. That interface can "borrow" the IP address of another interface 
already configured on the router (the Loopback0 interface in this case), which 
conserves network and address space [25]. After each tunnel’s initial 
configuration the explicit route is defined in a hop – by – hop manner with the 
command “ip explicit-path name def-LER enable.” 
In the test-bed, all nine tunnels are implemented by using the “explicit 
paths” method (i.e., manually by the administrator). The implementation of 
dynamic tunnels (automatically set up by the ingress LER), has been avoided 
since the diversion path should be clearly defined by the network’s administrator 
in order to lead the malicious traffic to the cleaning center, through a “safe” route. 
The command “priority-list 1 protocol ip high tcp 
telnet” gives the highest priority to Telnet packets, while the command 
“priority-list 1 protocol ip low” gives a lower priority to the rest of 
the tcp packets. The command “priority-group 1” under the definition of 
interface “Ethernet0/1” dictates the interfaces to follow this priority arrangement. 
Finally, the passwords to protect the router from unauthorized access are 
set up. The command “line con 0” sets the password to restrict configuration 
change with the command “enable” in a console window. The command “line 
vty 0 4” sets the password to control inbound Telnet connections. Both 
passwords, for simplicity, are set to “vordos” on all routers. 
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The configuration of the rest of LER routers is similar to the one in Table 2 
except for the values of some parameters such as the IP addresses for the 
loopback interfaces, and IP addresses for network interfaces. 
b. Installing LSR Router 
The configuration of the LSR router is simpler than the LER routers 
because MPLS tunnels are already configured at the ingress edge routers. Like 
the LER routers, a Cisco 3620 router with Cisco IOS 12.2(3) is used for the LSR 
router. Table 3 shows the configuration for the LSR router—LSR1. 
 
Configuration of LSR router – LSR1 
Building configuration... 
 
Current configuration : 1577 bytes 
! 
version 12.2 
service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log uptime 





















 ip address 192.168.10.1 255.255.255.255 
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 
 description connection to Router LER1 
 ip address 192.168.7.1 255.255.255.0 
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 half-duplex 
 mpls traffic-eng tunnels 
 tag-switching ip 
 priority-group 1 
 ip rsvp bandwidth 10000 10000 
! 
interface Ethernet0/1 
 description connection to LER3 
 ip address 192.168.5.1 255.255.255.0 
 half-duplex 
 mpls traffic-eng tunnels 
 tag-switching ip 
 priority-group 1 
 ip rsvp bandwidth 10000 10000 
! 
interface Ethernet0/2 
 description connection to LER2 
 ip address 192.168.4.1 255.255.255.0 
 half-duplex 
 mpls traffic-eng tunnels 
 tag-switching ip 
 priority-group 1 
 ip rsvp bandwidth 10000 10000 
! 
interface Ethernet0/3 
 description connection to LER4 
 ip address 192.168.6.1 255.255.255.0 
 half-duplex 
 mpls traffic-eng tunnels 
 tag-switching ip 
 priority-group 1 
 ip rsvp bandwidth 10000 10000 
! 
interface FastEthernet1/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
router ospf 99 
 router-id 192.168.10.1 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
 mpls traffic-eng router-id Loopback0 
 mpls traffic-eng area 0 
! 
ip classless 
no ip http server 
! 
priority-list 1 protocol ip high tcp telnet 
priority-list 1 protocol ip low 
! 
! 










line con 0 
 password vordos 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 




Table 3.   MPLS-TE Configuration of LSR Router – LSR1 
 
6. Target 
One Windows XP machine is selected as a target machine. The IP 
address 192.168.3.1 is assigned to this Windows machine. Wireshark is loaded 
onto this machine to capture the packets and to note the efficacy of the DDoS 
attack.  
7. Traffic Generator 
To test the effectiveness of the selected MPLS-TE technique, DDoS 
attacks for the test-bed network described above must be created. The hardware 
available for this task is the SmartBits 6000C Performance Analysis System of 
Spirent Communications, with one LAN-3321A TeraMetrics XD module with two 
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Copper ports and two Gigabit Ethernet Fiber ports. 
The system offers the ability to create customized layer-three and layer-four 
packets in IPv4 and IPv6 formats.  
Furthermore, it provides the user with the capability to customize layer-two 
information (i.e., source and destination MAC address). All the ports of the 
module can operate in full or half duplex mode. The interfaces act as regular  
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hosts inside a network. To control the system, the SmartWindow version 
7.70.128 Graphical User Interface (GUI) application is used. The figures below 
present the main screens of this application. 
 
 




Figure 17.   SmartWindow main screen for SmartBits 6000C device 
Since the purpose of this study was to test the MPLS-TE network’s 
reaction on a massive DDoS attack, a sophisticated attack does not have to be 
engineered. So, the author chose a simple attack to implement in the laboratory: 
an ICMP flood attack. As described in the Background chapter, in this kind of 
attack, the attacker sends a large number of ICMP_ECHO packets (“ping”) to the 
victim system. An ICMP flood attack is very easy to be addressed by applying a 
simple rule on the router’s ACL, which blocks all the incoming ICMP packets. 
However, since this attack was used in previous BGP BHR studies, this solution 
is followed for comparable results in this study. 
To craft the ICMP packets used for the attack, CommView version 6.0 of 
Tamosoft and Wireshark are used. Once the desired ICMP packets are crafted, 




10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Copper ports, is used to simulate the DDoS attack. 
The in-depth explanation of this entire process is provided in Puri’s thesis 
Appendix H [3]. 
C. AUTOMATIC INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
1.  IDS (SNORT®) Setup 
This is one of the most important and critical components of the network 
test-bed. There are two basic types of IDSs on the market. The first type is the 
network based IDSs (NIDS) that is designed to monitor traffic for multiple hosts in 
the network. The other type of IDS used to detect changes or malicious activity 
for one specific host, is called a host-based IDS (HIDS). As Puri proved in his 
second chapter of thesis research [3], the most suitable type of IDS for this 
research is a NIDS. Since one purpose of this research is to compare the BGP 
BHR with the MPLS-TE techniques, the same IDS as in Puri’s study – Snort® is 
selected. Snort® version 2.6.1 software is downloaded from the official Snort® 
site. This Snort® web site reference manual and Puri’s directions were very 
helpful in setting up the alerter on this current network [26], [3]. Snort® i installed 
on Fedora 8.0. Snort® software versions are also available for Windows, Solaris, 
and others. Research has revealed that Snort® is most stable with a Linux-based 
environment. The following are the step-by-step details followed for setting up 
Snort. 
a.  Before Snort®’s Installation 
Before Snort®’s installation, some basic network settings have to 
be performed, installed and configured the services needed to run. During this 
setup, the firewall is turned off for simplicity. While configuring the network, the 
following should be clearly configured: 
(1) IP Address. One IP address is allocated to the alerter. The IP 
address provided to our Fedora machine is 192.168.3.2 and configured for 
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Ethernet which sniffs the traffic for network 192.168.3.0/24. Since this interface 
runs in promiscuous mode, there is no actual need for its IP address to belong to 
a specific network. 
(2) Netmask. A network mask of 255.255.255.0 is used. 
(3) Gateway. As default gateway is provided the LER router’s 
interface address 192.168.3.128.  
(4) DNS Server. In this scenario, a DNS server is not configured. 
(5) Services. Ports 22, 23, 80, 443, and 3306 are enabled to 
support SSH, TELNET, HTTP, SSL and MySQL services in the Fedora box.  
Before installing Snort®, the following required components are 
also preinstalled:  
mysql, mysql-bench, mysql-server, mysql-devel, php-mysql, httpd, 
gcc, pcre-devel, php-gd, gd, mod_ssl, glib2-devel, gcc-c++, mysql-connector-
odbc, mysql-server, libnet10-1.0.2a, libpcap-1.10 
b.  Installing MySQL and Snort® 
At this stage, the Snort® is installed and the MySQL database to 
configure the Snort® alerts is configured. Furthermore, a few directories that 
would be used by Snort® are created. 
Snort® version 2.6.1 is downloaded into “/” directory. The file name 
of the Snort® package is snort-2.6.1.3.tar.gz. This file is extracted and compiled 
as follows: 
tar zxvf snort-2.6.1.3.tar.gz 
cd snort-2.6.1.3 




The above commands successfully installed Snort® in the Fedora 
machine. The third command indicates that Snort® is compiled with MySQL and 
enables dynamic plug-in to the program. 
The up-to-date Snort®’s rules were found on its official website, 
which are downloaded into the /usr/local/src directory and are copied into newly 




tar zxvf /usr/localsrc/snortrules-snapshot-Current.tar.gz –C 
/etc/snort 
cp etc/*.conf* /etc/snort 
cp etc/*.map /etc/snort 
ln –s /usr/local/bin/snort /usr/sbin/snort 
The following three commands created a Snort® user and user 
group in the snort directory. 
groupadd snort 
useradd -g snort snort 
chown snort:snort /var/log/snort 
In order to get Snort® up and running, a few configuration changes 
in a file called snort.conf, which exists within the /snort/snort-2.6.1.3 directory are 
required. This file is edited, the string “var RULE_PATH” is located and the 
variable is modified as follows: 
var RULE_PATH /etc/snort/rules 
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Then, the following string “database: log to variety of 
databases” is located and the following line, directly after the commented lines, 
is added: 
output database: log, mysql, user=snort password=password 
dbname=snort host=localhost 
The line above tells Snort® to log the events in the MySQL 
database. Snort® is also provided with the details of the database. The database 
name is “snort,” the user name is also “snort,” and the password is “password.” 
At this point, the database named “snort” in MySQL has been 
created. To achieve this, the following statements are issued: 
mysql 
SET PASSWORD FOR root@localhost=PASSWORD(‘password’); 
create database snort; 
grant CREATE, INSERT, SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE on snort.* to 
snort@localhost; 
SET PASSWORD FOR snort@localhost=PASSWORD(‘password’); 
exit 
The Snort® package also contained the schema for various 
databases. These schema are stored in the snort-2.6.1.3 directory. The following 
commands activate the database schema: 
/snort-2.6.1.3/schemas 
mysql –p < create_mysql snort 
So the database called snort has been created. Now, the Snort® 
installation can be tested by giving the following command: 
/usr/local/bin/snort -c /etc/snort/snort.conf 
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The Snort® process creates the alert file under /var/log/snort/ on its 
own. The permissions of the alert file have to be changed so that the Snort® user 
can access that file. This is achieved by giving the following commands: 
chown snort: snort /var/log/snort/alert 
chmod 600 /var/log/snort/alert 
c.  Installing Snort®’s Graphic Interface 
At this point, BASE and ADODB packages have to be installed. The 
ADODB package provides the interface between the GUI and the MySQL 
database. Additionally, the BASE package provides the graphical front end to the 
snort database. These packages are downloaded from sourceforge and are 
installed to ensure the proper functioning of Snort® and its customized Snort® 
rule:  
cd /var/www/html 
tar zxvf /root/adodb490.tgz 
tar zxvf /root/base-1.2.7.tar.gz 
chown apache base-1.2.7 
service httpd restart 
Now, the http service has been restarted and   the BASE is 
configured by opening the browser with URL http://localhost/base-
1.2.7. 
The BASE setup program starts on its own. It prompts for the path 
to ADODB in the first step. The path name is given as /var/www/html/adodb. 
The next step is to enter the database name, database host, database user 
name, and database password. Exactly the same details as configured above in 
this section are entered. Then “the submit query” button on the screen is 
clicked. On-screen instructions in the setup script are followed to create the 
database tables used by the BASE application. When done, the “Create BASE 
 59
AG” button is clicked and the tables are created. The next screen is the login 
screen. The login credentials are entered and the BASE main screen appears as 
in the following figure: 
 
Figure 18.   BASE snapshoot 
To enable the BASE graphing capability the php-pear-1.6.2-
2.noach.rpm and php-gd-5.2.6-2.i380.rpm packages are installed and the 
following commands entered: 
pear install Image_Color 
pear install Log 
pear install Numbers_Roman 
pear install http://pear.php.net/get/Numbers_Words-
0.15.0.tgz 
pear install http://pear.php.net/get/Image_Graph-0.3dev4.tgz 
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2. Automation of Attack Response 
The DDoS mitigation technique introduced by this thesis research is a 
reactive technique. To achieve the automated response, the Intrusion Detection 
System should not only log events, but also react to the attack attempts. Such a 
behavioral enhancement turns the IDS (detection only) into an Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention (IDP) solution. 
Snort® provides the capability to analyze data and take action based on 
the results. Techniques used to take action can be written in one’s own custom 
script, using an available plug-in, by writing one’s own plug-in. As Puri stated in 
his study: 
After thorough research, it was found that a Snort has been 
extended with an output plug-in that notifies the SnortSam agent of 
blocking requests on a rule basis. SnortSam, developed by Mr. 
Frank Knobe (www.snortsam.net) is an intelligent agent that allows 
Snort to block connections by configuring firewalls or routers. 
SnortSam requires the Snort rule to be modified. The biggest 
advantage of this SnortSam agent is that it is built on the client-
agent-based concept. SnortSam runs as an independent process 
and does not increase the workload of Snort. 
For the above advantages and in order to produce comparable results 
with Puri’s research, the SnortSam plug-in program is chosen to achieve the 
IDS’s automatic reaction. 
3. Install SnortSam 
The SnortSam is installed in accordance with SnortSam’s installation 
guide [27].  
The source file (snortsam-src-2.60.tar.gz) has been downloaded from the 
SnortSam web site at http://www.snortsam.net and installed by issuing the 
following commands: 
tar zxvf snortsam-src-2.60.tar.gz 
cd snortsam 
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chmod +x makesnortsam.sh 
./makesnortsam.sh  
Since SnortSam is compiled, the binary is copied into the folder 
/usr/local/bin. 
The next step is to add the SnortSam plug-in into Snort®. The snortsam-
patch.tar.gz file from the SnortSam web site is downloaded and the following 
commands are entered in order to install it: 
tar zxvf snortsam-patch.tar.gz 
chmod +x patchsnort.sh 
./patchsnort.sh /snort-2.6.1.3/ 
Then Snort® is configured with the commands previously shown. 
After installing the SnortSam module, the snortsam.conf file, located under 
the /snortsam/conf directory, is configured. The file is edited and the following 





cisconullroute 192.168.10.5 vordos vordos 
cisconullroute 192.168.10.3 vordos vordos 
cisconullroute 192.168.10.4 vordos vordos 
The above configuration tells the SnortSam client to accept the 
connections from the local host as well as 192.168.3.0/24 (the IDS’s 
subnetwork). The logfile option tells it where to log files. Finally, the commands 
“cisconullroute 192.168.10.5 vordos vordos” ,”cisconullroute 
192.168.10.3 vordos vordos” and “cisconullroute 192.168.10.4 
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vordos vordos” tells the client to use the cisconullroute plug-in three times 
with a different router’s IP address each time; 192.168.10.5, 192.168.10.3 and 
192.168.10.3 are the IP addresses of the routers where the SnortSam module 
will log in. The first “vordos” is the login password for the telnet session and the 
second “vordos” is the password to enter the configuration mode of the Cisco 
router. 
The next step is to reconfigure the /etc/snort/snort.conf file. The output 
plug-in needs to be added so that Snort® can send the block request of the 
destination IP address. The following command is added in the snort.conf file. 
output alert_fwsam: 127.0.0.1 
That command told Snort® to send the blocking request to the local 
machine. The IP address 127.0.0.1 indicates that the SnortSam module is 
configured on the same machine where Snort is configured. 
Snort allows users to write their own rules as per organizational 
requirements. By default, all the Snort rules are found in the /etc/snort/rules 
directory. The rules folder contains a file named “local.rules” through which the 
user can add customized rules. The following rule is added to this file to invoke a 
blocking of the destination IP address on the Cisco routers. 
alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg: “ICMP 
Denial of Service Test”; itype: 8; classtype: misc-
activity; threshold: type both, track by_dst, count 100, 
seconds 10; sid: 1000001; rev: 1 ; fwsam: dst, 20 minutes;) 
In general, this rule will look for a minimum of 100 ICMP echo request 
packets within 10 seconds before generating an alert and then ignore the rest of 
the packets. The option “fwsam: dst, 20 minutes;” at the end of the rule 
body told Snort® to invoke a block of 20 minutes on the destination address via 
the SnortSam module whenever the above rule fired. The alert is presented on 
the BASE interface with the message “ICMP Denial of Service Test”, as 
in the following figure: 
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Figure 19.   Successful activation of custom rule 
Further details for the above rule are provided in Puri’s thesis Appendix G 
[3]. 
After modifying the above files, we give the following command to restart 
Snort. 
service snortd restart 
Then the following command is entered: 
./snortsam conf/snortsam.conf 
From this point forward the SnortSam is running and listening for alerts 
from Snort®. 
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4. Modify ing the Plug-in’s Source Code 
The ssp_cisco_nullroute.c is a C file and it is one of SnortSam’s plug-in 
programs. Its original purpose is to perform null routing, in a BGP BHR 
technique, by doing the following three things: 
• Logs on the trigger router via telnet. 
• Issues a command to enter the “null-route.” 
• When the time interval of blocking expires, it removes the added 
route to null0. 
This program is found to be close to this research’s intentions and so the 
author decided to use it with the following modifications. At the beginning its 
original command “ip route %s 255.255.255.255 null 0\r” is replaced 
with the following 3 new commands:  
ip route %s 255.255.255.255 ethernet1/0 \r 
ip route %s 255.255.255.255 tunnel11 \r 
ip route %s 255.255.255.255 tunnel12 \r 
Only one of the above commands is executed in each telnet session and 
the right choice between them is based on the provided router’s ip address by 
the snortsam.conf file, through an “if” command. 
Furthermore, the original program did not terminate each time the telnet 
session and that caused delays to the response time. 
Finally, each command’s number of characters is reduced to the minimum 
accepted from a Cisco router, in order to further reduce each telnet session’s 
duration. 
The modified program now does the following.  
• Logs on the cleaning center’s LER router via telnet. 
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• Issues the command “ip route 192.168.3.1 
255.255.255.255 ethernet1/0\r.” 
• Logs on the LER2 router via telnet. 
• Issues the command “ip route 192.168.3.1 
255.255.255.255 tunnel12.” 
• Logs on the LER3 router via telnet. 
• Issues the command “ip route 192.168.3.1 
255.255.255.255 tunnel11.” 
• When the time interval of blocking expires, it removes the 
previously added static routes. 
The modified C file is attached as Appendix B. 
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IV. TESTI NG—RESULTS—ANALYSIS  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents the experimental results from testing the test-bed 
network against a series of manufactured DDoS attacks of different intensities. 
The second section of this chapter described how the network operated before 
the attacks and the typical sequence of events in its response to one such attack. 
The third section described the performance metrics used in this thesis. The 
fourth section presented the analysis of the collected timing results from all the 
attacks. Finally, in the fifth section, the performance results are compared with 
those reported for BGP BHR.  
B. TESING 
1. Before the Attack 
Before the attack, the network was under normal operation. The LER2 
forwarded traffic to the target host through MPLS tunnel 13 and LER3 through 
tunnel 10. Each of these tunnels was configured with a bandwidth of 4.8 Mbps. 
The reverse traffic from the target host to LER2 was transported through tunnel 
15 and to LER3 through tunnel 16. 
The scenario is depicted in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20.   Test-bed before the attack 
The forwarding tables of routers LER1, LER2 and LER3 before the attack 
were as in the following three Tables 4 to 6. Bold letters show the default routes 







Forwarding Table of LER1 Before the Attack  
LER1#show ip route 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, su - IS-IS summary, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2 
       ia - IS-IS inter area, * - candidate default, U - per-user static route 
       o - ODR, P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
     192.168.10.0/32 is subnetted, 5 subnets 
O       192.168.10.2 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:07:34, Tunnel19 
O       192.168.10.3 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:07:34, Tunnel18 
O       192.168.10.1 [110/11] via 192.168.7.1, 00:07:34, Ethernet1/1 
O       192.168.10.4 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:07:34, Tunnel17 
C       192.168.10.5 is directly connected, Loopback0 
O    192.168.4.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.7.1, 00:07:34, Ethernet1/1 
O    192.168.5.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.7.1, 00:07:34, Ethernet1/1 
O    192.168.6.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.7.1, 00:07:34, Ethernet1/1 
C    192.168.7.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet1/1 
     192.168.0.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
O       192.168.0.100 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:07:34, Tunnel17 
                      [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:07:34, Tunnel18 
O    192.168.1.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:07:34, Tunnel17 
C    192.168.2.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet1/0 
O    192.168.3.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:07:36, Tunnel19 




















Forwarding Table of LER2 Before the Attack  
LER2#show ip route 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, su - IS-IS summary, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2 
       ia - IS-IS inter area, * - candidate default, U - per-user static route 
       o - ODR, P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
     192.168.10.0/32 is subnetted, 5 subnets 
O       192.168.10.2 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:08:23, Tunnel13 
O       192.168.10.3 [110/21] via 192.168.4.1, 00:08:23, Ethernet0/1 
O       192.168.10.1 [110/11] via 192.168.4.1, 00:08:23, Ethernet0/1 
C       192.168.10.4 is directly connected, Loopback0 
O       192.168.10.5 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:08:23, Tunnel12 
C    192.168.4.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.5.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.4.1, 00:08:23, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.6.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.4.1, 00:08:23, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.7.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.4.1, 00:08:23, Ethernet0/1 
     192.168.0.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
C       192.168.0.100 is directly connected, Ethernet1/1 
C    192.168.1.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet0/0 
O    192.168.2.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:08:23, Tunnel12 
O    192.168.3.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:08:24, Tunnel13 
















Forwarding Table of LER3 Before the Attack  
LER3#show ip route 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, su - IS-IS summary, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2 
       ia - IS-IS inter area, * - candidate default, U - per-user static route 
       o - ODR, P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
     192.168.10.0/32 is subnetted, 5 subnets 
O       192.168.10.2 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:06:02, Tunnel10 
C       192.168.10.3 is directly connected, Loopback0 
O       192.168.10.1 [110/11] via 192.168.5.1, 00:06:02, Ethernet0/1 
O       192.168.10.4 [110/21] via 192.168.5.1, 00:06:02, Ethernet0/1 
O       192.168.10.5 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:06:02, Tunnel11 
O   192.168.4.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.5.1, 00:06:02, Ethernet0/1 
C   192.168.5.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet0/1 
O   192.168.6.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.5.1, 00:06:02, Ethernet0/1 
O   192.168.7.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.5.1, 00:06:02, Ethernet0/1 
     192.168.0.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
C       192.168.0.100 is directly connected, Ethernet1/1 
O       192.168.1.0/24 [110/30] via 192.168.5.1, 00:06:02, Ethernet0/1 
O       192.168.2.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:06:02, Tunnel11 
O       192.168.3.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:06:02, Tunnel10 
Table 6.   LER3’s Forwarding Table Before the Attack 
2. During the Attack 
As stated in Chapter III, the selected type of attack was an ICMP flood 
attack launched from the SmartBits 6000C system. Different attack flows were 
created with the SmartBits application. A total of eleven different attack flows 
were evaluated, each with a different traffic intensity, starting from a relatively 
small number of frames per second (fps) up to the maximum capability of the 
packet generator for the specific connections created. Each flow was divided 
equally into two parts so that about a half of the total traffic would pass through 
each of the two border routers. For the final attack flow, the maximum bit- rate of 




Attack Flow # Total Frame Rate  
(fps) 
Total Bit Rate  
(Mbps) 
1 1688 1.84 
2 3376 3.34 
3 5066 5.02 
4 6756 6.7 
5 8272 8.36 
6 8444 8.53 
7 10134 10.04 
8 11820 11.72 
9 13512 13.38 
10 15202 15.08 
11 16890 16.76 
Table 7.   Attack Flows 
Flow #5 was the maximum flow under which the CPU load of every router 
was below 80 percent in the test-bed. Above this level, LSR1 reached a state of 
CPU overload and its behavior became very unstable. Because of that, it was 
assumed that Flows #6 through #11 simulate a heavy DDoS attack for networks 
where the limiting factor is the router CPU load. 
The sequence of events triggered by an attack with Flow #6 is presented 
here. After the attack was started, the malicious packets started to show on the 
capture window of the Wireshark application running on the target host. Figure 
21 shows a snapshot of that capture window. The packets of the attack flow with 
their source IP address 192.168.1.101 can be identified. 
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Figure 21.   Initiation of attack captured by target host’s Wireshark application 
As discussed in Chapter III, the IDS/automation host was connected to the 
same network as the target host through a hub. Once the IDS detected the 
attack, it invoked the customized “ssp_cisco_nullroute.c” program. At the 
beginning the IDS/automation host (with IP address 192.168.3.2) started a telnet 
session with LER1 (with IP address 192.168.10.5) and added a static route for 
transporting the attack traffic to the cleaning center with the router configuration 
command “ip route 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.255 ethernet 1/0” as captured in 
Figure 22. The telnet session was initiated 0.033 seconds after the attack was 












Figure 23.   Snapshot of Wireshark capture window showing the system’s first 
response 
To redirect the attack traffic from the two border routers to LER1, the 
IDS/automation host then launched two more telnet sessions: one for logging on 
the border router LER2 (with IP address 192.168.10.4) and adding a static route 
via the router configuration command “ip route 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.255 
tunnel 12”, and the other for remotely adding a static route to the border router 
LER3 (with IP address 192.168.10.3) via the router configuration command “ip 
route 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.255 tunnel 11”. Figures 24 and 25 show the telnet 
commands for LER2 and LER3, respectively, captured by Wireshark when being 








Figure 24.   Telnet commands used to add the redirection route to LER2. 
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Figure 25.   Telnet commands used to add the redirection route to LER3 
All the static routes were added within a second. The last reception of a 
malicious packet on the target host happened 0.814 seconds after the reception 
of the first. Figure 26 shows the last received packet as captured by Wireshark 
running on the target host. 
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Figure 26.   Snapshot of Wireshark capture window showing the attack’s 
termination. 
At this point, the DDoS attack against the target host was mitigated. All the 
malicious traffic was being redirected to the Windows XP machine simulating the 
network’s cleaning center (i.e., the host with IP address 192.68.2.1 in Figure 20). 
This behavior can be seen from the following snapshot (Figure 27) captured by 
Wireshark running on the Windows XP machine. 
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Figure 27.   Snapshot from Wireshark running on the cleaning center host. 
Tables 8-10 display the forwarding tables of routers LER1, LER2 and 
LER3 after the attack’s mitigation. The entries with bold letters show the new 











Forwarding Table of LER1 After the Attack’s Mitigation  
LER1#show ip route 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, su - IS-IS summary, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2 
       ia - IS-IS inter area, * - candidate default, U - per-user static route 
       o - ODR, P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
     192.168.10.0/32 is subnetted, 5 subnets 
O       192.168.10.2 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:33:05, Tunnel19 
O       192.168.10.3 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:33:05, Tunnel18 
O       192.168.10.1 [110/11] via 192.168.7.1, 00:33:05, Ethernet1/1 
O       192.168.10.4 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:33:05, Tunnel17 
C       192.168.10.5 is directly connected, Loopback0 
O    192.168.4.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.7.1, 00:33:05, Ethernet1/1 
O    192.168.5.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.7.1, 00:33:05, Ethernet1/1 
O    192.168.6.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.7.1, 00:33:05, Ethernet1/1 
C    192.168.7.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet1/1 
     192.168.0.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
O       192.168.0.100 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:33:05, Tunnel17 
                      [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:33:05, Tunnel18 
O    192.168.1.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:33:05, Tunnel17 
C    192.168.2.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet1/0 
     192.168.3.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
S       192.168.3.1/32 is directly connected, Ethernet1/0 
O       192.168.3.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:33:08, Tunnel19 


















Forwarding Table of LER2 After the Attack’s Mitigation 
LER2#show ip route 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, su - IS-IS summary, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2 
       ia - IS-IS inter area, * - candidate default, U - per-user static route 
       o - ODR, P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
     192.168.10.0/32 is subnetted, 5 subnets 
O       192.168.10.2 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:35:31, Tunnel13 
O       192.168.10.3 [110/21] via 192.168.4.1, 00:35:31, Ethernet0/1 
O       192.168.10.1 [110/11] via 192.168.4.1, 00:35:31, Ethernet0/1 
C       192.168.10.4 is directly connected, Loopback0 
O       192.168.10.5 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:35:31, Tunnel12 
C    192.168.4.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.5.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.4.1, 00:35:31, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.6.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.4.1, 00:35:31, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.7.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.4.1, 00:35:31, Ethernet0/1 
     192.168.0.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
C       192.168.0.100 is directly connected, Ethernet1/1 
C    192.168.1.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet0/0 
O    192.168.2.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:35:31, Tunnel12 
     192.168.3.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
S       192.168.3.1/32 is directly connected, Tunnel12 
O       192.168.3.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:35:35, Tunnel13 
 














Forwarding Table of LER3 After the Attack’s Mitigation 
LER3#show ip route 
Codes: C - connected, S - static, I - IGRP, R - RIP, M - mobile, B - BGP 
       D - EIGRP, EX - EIGRP external, O - OSPF, IA - OSPF inter area 
       N1 - OSPF NSSA external type 1, N2 - OSPF NSSA external type 2 
       E1 - OSPF external type 1, E2 - OSPF external type 2, E - EGP 
       i - IS-IS, su - IS-IS summary, L1 - IS-IS level-1, L2 - IS-IS level-2 
       ia - IS-IS inter area, * - candidate default, U - per-user static route 
       o - ODR, P - periodic downloaded static route 
 
Gateway of last resort is not set 
 
     192.168.10.0/32 is subnetted, 5 subnets 
O       192.168.10.2 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:32:41, Tunnel10 
C       192.168.10.3 is directly connected, Loopback0 
O       192.168.10.1 [110/11] via 192.168.5.1, 00:32:41, Ethernet0/1 
O       192.168.10.4 [110/21] via 192.168.5.1, 00:32:41, Ethernet0/1 
O       192.168.10.5 [110/21] via 0.0.0.0, 00:32:41, Tunnel11 
O    192.168.4.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.5.1, 00:32:41, Ethernet0/1 
C    192.168.5.0/24 is directly connected, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.6.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.5.1, 00:32:41, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.7.0/24 [110/20] via 192.168.5.1, 00:32:41, Ethernet0/1 
     192.168.0.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
C       192.168.0.100 is directly connected, Ethernet1/1 
O    192.168.1.0/24 [110/30] via 192.168.5.1, 00:32:41, Ethernet0/1 
O    192.168.2.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:32:41, Tunnel11 
     192.168.3.0/24 is variably subnetted, 2 subnets, 2 masks 
S       192.168.3.1/32 is directly connected, Tunnel11 
O       192.168.3.0/24 [110/30] via 0.0.0.0, 00:32:41, Tunnel10 
Table 10.   LER3’s Forwarding Table after the mitigation of the attack 
After the attack’s redirection, LSR1 presented anomalies after about 1 
minute.  It started to lose connections with the rest of the routers. This unstable 
behavior was observed for attack Flows #6 to #11. As the traffic volume went 
higher, it took a shorter time for LSR1 to go down. When the attack traffic was 
the most intensive, i.e., 16.76 Mbps with attack Flow #11, LSR1’s failure time 
was only 45 seconds. Further examinations revealed that the router’s CPU load 
was more than 80% during those attacks, resulting in unstable behaviors. Figure 




Figure 28.   Router logs from LSR reporting unstable behaviors 
3. Additional Test of Selective Unblocking 
After the successful redirection of the attack traffic the part of the attack 
traffic coming in from router LER2 was manually stopped. A new telnet session 
from the IDS host with LER2 was started. The redirection route from LER2’s 
forwarding table was removed through this session via the router configuration 
command “no ip route 192.168.3.1 255.255.255.255 tunnel12”. Then, from the 
Windows XP machine (with IP address 192.168.1.1) connected to router LER2, 
the target host was pinged with the shell command “ping –t 192.168.3.1.” These 
ping packets arrived at the target host. In other words, the traffic from LER2 was 
successfully returned to the normal path, as illustrated in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29.   Snapshot from target’s Wireshark after the selective unblocking on 
router LER2 
C. PERFORMANCE METRICS  
The main performance metric for this research is the overall response time 
of the network during an attack – which is referred to simply as “mitigation time” 
in the rest of this thesis. It is defined to be the time interval from the reception of 
the first malicious packet at the target host to the reception of the last malicious 
packet at the same host. 
The IDS’s first response time was also measured as the time interval 
between the reception of the first malicious packet at the target host and the 
transmission of the first redirection route (for LER1) from the IDS host.  
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To derive both performance metrics the Wireshark packet captures from 
the target host were used. The target and IDS hosts were connected to the same 
hub, hence, the Wireshark application running on the target host also captured 
packets from the IDS host. Wireshark gives time accuracy of 0.00001 second 
and this granularity was adequate for the needs of this research. 
The last performance metric collected was the router CPU load. For this 
purpose the router configuration command “show processes cpu history" was 
used. This command displayed the router’s CPU load information for the last 
sixty seconds, one hour, and seventy two hours. Figure 30 presents an example 
output of this command. 
 
Figure 30.   LER1 CPU load for attack flow 8.36 Mbps 
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D. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results of the research are presented in this section. As noted in 
Chapter III, eleven different flows in the packet generator were specified. The first 
five flows were to simulate low-to-medium attack traffic for the specific routers 
used in the test-bed networks. The next five flows were to simulate high attack 
traffic. In order to achieve more accurate results, each experiment was run ten 
times, and then the average of the mitigation times and IDS’s first response times 
were calculated. Figures 31 and 32 show the performance of the test-bed 
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Figure 32.   Mean time for IDS’s first response for different attack flows 
The numeric results are presented in Table 11. 
Flow # Attack traffic intensity 
(Mbps) 
Mean Mitigation Time 
(sec) 
Mean IDS First 
Response Time (sec) 
1 1.84 0.73709 0.12718 
2 3.34 0.71162 0.06746 
3 5.02 0.73147 0.04893 
4 6.7 0.77802 0.03918 
5 8.36 0.80531 0.03431 
6 8.53 0.81185 0.03332 
7 10.04 0.96776 0.02943 
8 11.72 1.05004 0.02683 
9 13.38 1.50339 0.02498 
10 15.08 1.65895 0.02333 
11 16.76 13.18943* 0.02243 
Table 11.   Summary of timing data for different attack flows. 
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As can be extracted from these results, the system responds in a very 
short period of time under the first ten attack flows. The mitigation of DDoS 
attacks was achieved in less than 1 second for the first seven flows and less than 
2 seconds for Flows # 8, 9 and 10. The IDS’s first response time was decreased 
as the attack intensity was increased. This behavior was expected, since the 
Snort®’s rule used is fired after the reception of 100 ICMP echo request packets 
within 10 seconds, as referred to in Chapter III. Hence, the higher the attack flow 
, the faster the condition of this rule was met.  
As already noted, for Flow #6 and higher, the CPU load of the core router 
LSR1 quickly exceeded 80%. Under this condition, LSR1 had an unstable 
behavior:  first it output the error message for each of its interfaces “from FULL to 
DOWN, Neighbor Down: Dead timer expired,” and very soon it wrote out another 
error message “from LOADING to FULL, Loading Done.” The messages were 
due to the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol. The OSPF neighbors 
exchange “hello” packets at multicast address 224.0.0.5. If these packets are not 
delivered because of any Layer 2 issue, OSPF neighbors flap, resulting in the 
first error message [28]. In this case, some OSPF “hello” packets were dropped 
because of traffic congestion. The second message occurred because the router 
finally received a new “hello” packet from its neighbors and it loaded the 
interfaces again. Those problems had “gap” effects on the received traffic by the 
cleaning center as shown in Figure 33. 
 89
 
Figure 33.   Traffic gaps at cleaning center host created by LSR1 failure due to 
heavy traffic 
The network exhibited extensive anomalies under Flow #11. The 
anomalies had a large impact on the mitigation time. Highly varying values, from 
4.6 seconds to 22 seconds, even though the measured IDS first response times 
were constant and very close to 0.022 seconds were obtained. In one case the 
system did not respond, even after 5 minutes. This problem was caused by high 
CPU load on router LSR1. (See Figure 37.) This high CPU load caused LSR1 to 
drop or delay the forwarding of the telnet packets used for mitigation. This router 
also became a traffic bottleneck even after redirection, because the two attack 




tunnel at LSR1 first, on their way to LER1. Above Flow #6, consolidation was 
unattainable since the total attack flow rate was greater than the configured 
tunnel capacity of 10 Mbps. 
Figures 34 to 37 show the CPU load measured on each network’s router, 
except router LER4. The LER4 router (target’s LER) had very low traffic, since 
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Figure 37.   CPU load of LSR1 (core router) 
The LER2 and LER3 routers had very similar CPU loads, as was 
expected, during all the tested attacks. They reached 80% CPU load only during 
the attacks with the maximum attack flow. Router LER1 never exceeded 65% 
CPU load. This can be explained by the already discussed bottleneck on LSR1. 
E. COMPARISON BETWEEN MPLS-TE AND BGP BHR 
Puri’s study appears to be more related to this thesis research. His test-
bed had almost the same topology. Furthermore, the IDS/automation system was 
almost identical. Unfortunately, Puri did not provide details about his testing 
methodology. He only alluded to the mitigation time in one of his conclusions, as 
follows: 
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…once an attack was detected the system close to 20 seconds to 
mitigate the D/DoS attack. This time includes the telnet/SSH 
session initiated from the IDS to the trigger router, advertisement of 
the null route to all the border routers, and dropping all the 
malicious packets at the AS boundary. 
Because of this lack of data, an in-depth quantitative performance 
comparison between Puri’s thesis and this research is not possible. Even if it is 
assumed that the 20-second time was obtained under an attack with the 
maximum bit rate of 16.76 Mbps, that performance is significantly worse than the 
time achieved by this current network for the same attack flow. 
Stamatelatos reported the average response times by a similar network 
setup albeit using BGP BHR, for a comparable set of attack flows [2]. His 
definition of response time, however, was based on the events of BGP route 
advertisements as he stated in his thesis [2]: 
The main performance metric for this research was the response 
time of the routers. And the most accurate way to measure those 
values was to capture the trigger router’s initial routing-
advertisement update and the border routers’ subsequent routing 
update messages. 
This definition does not take into account the time that it takes to detect 
the attack and the time it takes to add a new static route to the trigger router. This 
was expected because no IDS was used and the static route was added to the 
trigger router manually in those experiments. Thus, the response times reported 
in Stamatelatos’s thesis [2] might have underestimated the actual response 
times. In contrast, this research’s definition of mitigation time includes all 
necessary steps from the attack’s detection to its mitigation. 
Figure 38 shows the average mitigation times from the current 
experiments together with the response times reported in Figure 36 of 
Stamatelatos’s thesis [2]. Even discounting the possible underestimation factor, 
this current network responded to the attacks slightly faster.  Another factor is 
worth mentioning.  The response times reported in Figure 36 of Stamatelatos’s 
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thesis were obtained using a Juniper router as the core router.  That router has a 
much higher CPU and link capacity than the Cisco router used for LSR1. 
Therefore, the Juniper router most likely did not suffer from the same anomalies 
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Figure 38.   Comparison of MPLS-TE and BGP BHR techniques 
The slightly better performance of the MPLS-TE technique may be due to 
use of the “priority list” command to give telnet sessions priority over other traffic. 
In contrast, BGP routing messages did not receive such preferential treatment in 
Stamatelatos’ BGP BHR work.  
The most significant advantage of the current technique compared to BGP 
BHR is that it does not indiscriminately drop packets destined to the target host. 
The traffic could be redirected to the cleaning center where it could be analyzed, 
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sanitized, and then sent to the target host. The forwarding of sanitized traffic to 
the target host can be easily accomplished with a slight modification to this 
network: adding a second LER for the cleaning center and configuring a 
dedicated tunnel from the new LER to the target host. With this approach no 
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V CONCLUSIONS 
A. CONCLUS IONS 
Using a real test-bed network, this study evaluated the performance of the 
proposed MPLS-TE technique for mitigating DDoS attacks. In Chapter IV, a real-
time fully automated attack detection and mitigation process was described. The 
network was tested under stressful situations in which the router CPU capacity 
and the link capacity became bottlenecks. In the same chapter the timing results 
were discussed and compared to the results from two prior studies of the BGP 
BHR techniques. The above actions led us to the following conclusions. 
The MPLS-TE technique provides a relatively simple implementation of 
the sinkhole routing method. It does not require special interface cards that may 
add significant processing overhead to the involved routers. The method allowed 
successful protection of the target host and kept it reachable for legitimate traffic 
within the AS. The overall system response time can be within seconds; 
comparable to the best results achieved with BGP BHR. Unlike BGP BHR 
techniques, the MPLS-TE technique avoids blind discarding of all traffic destined 
to the target host. Furthermore, it provides the capability to analyze the traffic 
(malicious or not) for forensics purposes.  
The main disadvantage of the MPLS-TE technique is that the 
infrastructure must be upgraded to support MPLS. This means that routers with 
older versions of software need to be replaced. 
Two other points should be noted, First, the MPLS-TE proposals in the 
literature use BGP protocol to advertise the redirection routes. In this study telnet 
was used for this purpose in order to simplify the router configurations and make 
the system more controllable. This also made it relatively easy to implement 
selective unblocking on any border router. As presented in Chapter IV, the telnet 
technique was very efficient and achieved mitigation times under two seconds 
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even under intense attack traffic. However telnet appears to have security issues. 
Those issues can be addressed by using Secure Shell protocol (SSH) instead of 
telnet, with only a small additional processing overhead. 
Second, by not discarding packets at border routers, the MPLS-TE 
technique may keep the target’s AS under stress even after the redirection of the 
attack traffic. For example, in the current test-bed, when the traffic flow rate went 
above 8.5 Mbps, the CPU load of the core router exceeded the safe threshold of 
80%, and in a short amount of time (less than a minute) the connections between 
this and other routers became unstable. Therefore, it is important for a network to 
have enough resources to deal with a large amount of malicious traffic when a 
sinkhole method is employed. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Research in the following two areas will provide a more complete 
evaluation of the utility of MPLS-TE in mitigation of DDoS attacks. 
1. The current study did not implement many important functions of the 
cleaning center. The cleaning center should perform traffic analysis and cleaning, 
forensics and archiving, and finally selective forwarding of “clean” packets to the 
target host. The employment of a suitable cleaning center with the above 
capabilities would provide a complete, integrated, anti-DDoS solution with which 
to assess the full mitigative benefits of the MPLS-TE technique.  
2. The current study used only one type of low to mid-range Cisco routers. 
Real-world large networks often consist of many types of routers with different 
capabilities and from different vendors. Thus, another potential area of future 








APPENDIX A. ROUTERS’ CONFIGURATION FILES 
Appendix A presents the configuration files for the rest test-bed’s network 
routers LER1, LER3 and LER4. 
Configuration of LER1 – Cleaning Center’s Router 
Current configuration : 2289 bytes 
! 
version 12.2 
service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log uptime 





















 ip address 192.168.10.5 255.255.255.255 
! 
interface Tunnel17 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.4 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER2 
! 
interface Tunnel18 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.3 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800 
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 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER3 
! 
interface Tunnel19 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.2 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 100 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER4 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 




 ip address 192.168.7.128 255.255.255.0 
 half-duplex 
 mpls traffic-eng tunnels 
 tag-switching ip 
 priority-group 1 
 ip rsvp bandwidth 10000 10000 
! 
interface Ethernet1/2 









router ospf 99 
 router-id 192.168.10.5 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
 mpls traffic-eng router-id Loopback0 
 mpls traffic-eng area 0 
! 
ip classless 
no ip http server 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER4 enable 
 next-address 192.168.7.1 
 next-address 192.168.6.128 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER2 enable 
 next-address 192.168.7.1 
 101
 next-address 192.168.4.128 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER3 enable 
 next-address 192.168.7.1 
 next-address 192.168.5.128 
! 
priority-list 1 protocol ip high tcp telnet 
priority-list 1 protocol ip low 
! 
! 





line con 0 
 password vordos 
 login 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 





Configuration of LER3 – Right Border Router 
Current configuration : 1916 bytes 
! 
version 12.2 
service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log uptime 










ip audit notify log 
ip audit po max-events 100 













 ip address 192.168.10.3 255.255.255.255 
! 
interface Tunnel10 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.2 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER4 
! 
interface Tunnel11 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.5 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER1 
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 




 description Connection to LSR1 
 ip address 192.168.5.128 255.255.255.0 
 half-duplex 
 mpls traffic-eng tunnels 
 tag-switching ip 
 priority-group 1 
 ip rsvp bandwidth 10000 10000 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 





 ip address 192.168.0.102 255.255.255.252 
 half-duplex 
! 
router ospf 99 
 router-id 192.168.10.3 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
 mpls traffic-eng router-id Loopback0 
 mpls traffic-eng area 0 
! 
ip classless 
no ip http server 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER4 enable 
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 next-address 192.168.5.1 
 next-address 192.168.6.128 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER1 enable 
 next-address 192.168.5.1 
 next-address 192.168.7.128 
! 
priority-list 1 protocol ip high tcp telnet 
priority-list 1 protocol ip low 
! 
! 






line con 0 
 password vordos 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 





Configuration of LER4 – Target Network’s Router 
Current configuration : 2339 bytes 
! 
version 12.2 
service timestamps debug uptime 
service timestamps log uptime 






















 ip address 192.168.10.2 255.255.255.255 
! 
interface Tunnel14 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.5 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 100 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER1 
! 
interface Tunnel15 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.4 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER2 
! 
interface Tunnel16 
 ip unnumbered Loopback0 
 tunnel destination 192.168.10.3 
 tunnel mode mpls traffic-eng 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng autoroute announce 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng priority 7 7 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng bandwidth 4800 
 tunnel mpls traffic-eng path-option 1 explicit name def-LER3 
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 









 description Connection to LSR1 
 ip address 192.168.6.128 255.255.255.0 
 half-duplex 
 mpls traffic-eng tunnels 
 tag-switching ip 
 priority-group 1 
 ip rsvp bandwidth 10000 10000 
! 
interface Ethernet0/3 





 no ip address 
 shutdown 
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 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
router ospf 99 
 router-id 192.168.10.2 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
 mpls traffic-eng router-id Loopback0 
 mpls traffic-eng area 0 
! 
ip classless 
no ip http server 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER1 enable 
 next-address 192.168.6.1 
 next-address 192.168.7.128 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER2 enable 
 next-address 192.168.6.1 
 next-address 192.168.4.128 
! 
ip explicit-path name def-LER3 enable 
 next-address 192.168.6.1 
 next-address 192.168.5.128 
! 
priority-list 1 protocol ip high tcp telnet 
priority-list 1 protocol ip low 
! 
! 









line con 0 
 password vordos 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
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APPENDIX B. SSP_CISCO_NULLROUTE.C FILE 
Appendix B presents the modified source code for the Cisco null route 
plug-in. The original code was developed by Mr. Frank Knobbe [29]. 
 
/* $Id: ssp_cisco_nullroute.c,v 2.3 2008/04/26 19:50:26 fknobbe Exp $ 
 * 
 * 
 * Copyright (c) 2005-2008 Frank Knobbe <frank@knobbe.us> 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
the 
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the 
distribution. 
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' 
AND 
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 
THE 
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE 
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE 
LIABLE 
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL 
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE 
GOODS 
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS 
INTERRUPTION) 
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 
STRICT 
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN 
ANY WAY 
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY 
OF 
 * SUCH DAMAGE. 
 * 
 * Acknowledgements: 
 * 
 * Brent Erickson and Sergio Salazar for the idea and sample commands. 
 * 
 * 
 * ssp_cisco_nullroute.c  
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 *  
 * Purpose:   
 * 
 * This SnortSam plugin telnet's into one or more Cisco routers and 
issues 
 * a route command to effectively "null-route" the intruding IP 
address. 






#ifndef  __SSP_CISCO_NULLROUTE_C__ 





















/* This routine parses the cisconullroute statements in the config 
file. 
 * It builds a list of routers) 
*/ 
void CiscoNullRouteParse(char *val,char *file,unsigned long 
line,DATALIST *plugindatalist) 
{ CISCONULLROUTEDATA *ciscop; 
 char *p2,msg[STRBUFSIZE+2],*p3; 
 struct in_addr routerip; 
 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 




 { p2=val; 
  while(*p2 && !myisspace(*p2)) 
   p2++; 
  if(*p2) 
   *p2++ =0; 
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  routerip.s_addr=getip(val); 
  if(routerip.s_addr)   /* If we have a valid 
IP address */ 
  {
 ciscop=safemalloc(sizeof(CISCONULLROUTEDATA),"ciscoparse","ciscop
"); /* create new router */ 
   plugindatalist->data=ciscop; 
   ciscop->ip.s_addr=routerip.s_addr; 
   ciscop->routersocket=0; 
   ciscop->loggedin=FALSE; 
   ciscop->username[0]=ciscop->enablepw[0]=ciscop-
>userlogin=0; 
   ciscop->telnetpw=ciscop->username; 
 
   if(*p2) 
   { val=p2; 
    while(*val && myisspace(*val)) /* now 
parse the remaining text */ 
     val++; 
    if(val) 
    { p2=val; 
     while(*p2 && !myisspace(*p2)) 
      p2++; 
     if(*p2) 
      *p2++ =0; 
     safecopy(ciscop->username,val); /* 
save telnet password */ 
 
     p3=strchr(ciscop->username,'/');  /* 
Check if a username is given */ 
     if(p3) 
     { *p3++ =0; 
      ciscop->telnetpw=p3; 
      ciscop->userlogin=TRUE; 
     } 
      
     if(*p2)      
   /* if we have a second password */ 
     { while(*p2 && myisspace(*p2)) 
       p2++; 
      safecopy(ciscop->enablepw,p2);/* it 
would be the enable password */ 
     } 
     else 
      safecopy(ciscop->enablepw,ciscop-
>telnetpw); /* if only one password was found, use it for both */ 
    } 
   } 
   if(!ciscop->telnetpw[0]) 
   { snprintf(msg,sizeof(msg)-1,"Error: [%s: %lu] 
Cisco Router defined without passwords!",file,line); 
    logmessage(1,msg,"cisconullroute",0); 
    free(ciscop); 
    plugindatalist->data=NULL; 
   } 
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#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 
   else 
    printf("Debug: [cisconullroute] Adding Cisco 
Router: IP \"%s\", PW \"%s\", EN \"%s\"\n",inettoa(ciscop-
>ip.s_addr),ciscop->telnetpw,ciscop->enablepw); 
#endif 
  } 
  else 
  { snprintf(msg,sizeof(msg)-1,"Error: [%s: %lu] Invalid 
CiscoNullRoute parameter '%s' ignored.",file,line,val); 
   logmessage(1,msg,"cisconullroute",0); 
  } 
 } 
 else 
 { snprintf(msg,sizeof(msg)-1,"Error: [%s: %lu] Empty 
CiscoNullRoute parameter.",file,line); 





/* This routine initiates the block. It walks the list of routers 
 * telnet's in, and issues the route command. 
 */ 
void CiscoNullRouteBlock(BLOCKINFO *bd,void *data,unsigned long qp) 
{   CISCONULLROUTEDATA *ciscop; 
 struct sockaddr_in thissocketaddr,routersocketaddr; 
 unsigned long flag; 
 char cnrmsg[STRBUFSIZE+1],cnrat[STRBUFSIZE+1]; 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 
#ifdef WIN32 
 unsigned long threadid=GetCurrentThreadId(); 
#else 





  return; 
    ciscop=(CISCONULLROUTEDATA *)data; 
 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 








 { routersocketaddr.sin_port=htons(23); /* telnet */ 
  routersocketaddr.sin_addr.s_addr=ciscop->ip.s_addr; 
  routersocketaddr.sin_family=AF_INET; 
 
  thissocketaddr.sin_port=htons(0); /* get a dynamic port  */ 
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  thissocketaddr.sin_addr.s_addr=0; 
  thissocketaddr.sin_family=AF_INET; 
 
  /* create socket */ 
  ciscop-
>routersocket=socket(PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP);  
  if(ciscop->routersocket==INVALID_SOCKET) 
  { snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,"Error: 
[cisconullroute] Couldn't create socket!"); 
   logmessage(1,cnrmsg,"cisconullroute",ciscop-
>ip.s_addr); 
   ciscop->routersocket=0; 
   return; 
  } 
  /* bind it */ 
  if(bind(ciscop->routersocket,(struct sockaddr 
*)&(thissocketaddr),sizeof(struct sockaddr))) 
  { snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,"Error: 
[cisconullroute] Couldn't bind socket!"); 
   logmessage(1,cnrmsg,"ciscocnullroute",ciscop-
>ip.s_addr); 
   ciscop->routersocket=0; 
   return; 
  } 
  /* and connect to router */ 
  if(connect(ciscop->routersocket,(struct sockaddr 
*)&routersocketaddr,sizeof(struct sockaddr)))  
  { snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,"Error: 
[cisconullroute] Could not connect to %s! Will try later.",cnrat); 
   logmessage(1,cnrmsg,"cisconullroute",ciscop-
>ip.s_addr); 
   closesocket(ciscop->routersocket); 
   ciscop->routersocket=0; 
  } 
 } 
 if(ciscop->routersocket) 
 { do 
  { 
#ifdef FWSAMDEBUG 
   printf("Debug: [cisconullroute][%lx] Connected to 
%s.\n",(unsigned long)threadid,cnrat); 
#endif 
   flag=-1; 
   ioctlsocket(ciscop->routersocket,FIONBIO,&flag);
 /* set non blocking  */ 
   flag=FALSE; 
    
   if(!ciscop->loggedin) 
   { if(ciscop->userlogin) 
    { if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop-
>ip,"","username","waiting for user logon prompt from ",cnrat)) 
     { flag=TRUE; 
      continue; 
     } 
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     snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-
1,"%s\r",ciscop->username); /* Send username password */ 
 
     if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,cnrmsg,"pass","at 
password prompt from ",cnrat)) 
     { flag=TRUE; 
      continue; 
     } 
     snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-
1,"%s\r",ciscop->telnetpw); /* Send telnet password */ 
    } 
    else 
    { if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,"","pass","waiting 
for logon prompt from ",cnrat)) 
     { flag=TRUE; 
      continue; 
     } 
     snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-
1,"%s\r",ciscop->telnetpw); /* Send telnet password */ 
    } 
 
    if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,cnrmsg,">","at 
logon prompt of ",cnrat)) 
    { flag=TRUE; 
     continue; 
    } 
    
    /* Send enable */      
           
    //Changed by the author to the minimum accepted 
command ("en" instead of "enable") by the cisco routers to reduce 
session's duration. 
    if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,"en\r","pass","at 
enable command of ",cnrat)) 
    { flag=TRUE; 
     continue; 
    } 
 
    /* Send enable password */ 
    snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,"%s\r",ciscop-
>enablepw);  
    if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,cnrmsg,"#","at 
enable prompt of ",cnrat)) 
    { flag=TRUE; 
     continue; 
    } 
 
    /* Send config */ 
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    //Changed by the author to the minimum accepted 
command ("conf t" instead of "configuration terminal") by the cisco 
routers to reduce session's duration. 
    if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,"conf t\r","#","at 
config command of ",cnrat)) 
    { flag=TRUE; 
     continue; 
    } 
    ciscop->loggedin=TRUE; 
   } 
    
   /* send route command */ 
   // The below 3 "if" commands added by the author in 
order to chose the correct static route to be added for the 
coresponding router. 
    if(strcmp(inettoa(ciscop->ip.s_addr), 
"192.168.10.5") == 0) { 
    // Changed by the author in order to fit to add 
to LER1 the correct static route. 
    snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,"%sip route %s 
255.255.255.255 e1/0\r",bd->block?"":"no ",inettoa(bd->blockip));  
   } 
    
   if(strcmp(inettoa(ciscop->ip.s_addr), "192.168.10.3") 
== 0) { 
    // Changed by the author in order to fit to add 
to LER3 the correct static route. 
    snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,"%sip route %s 
255.255.255.255 t11\r",bd->block?"":"no ",inettoa(bd->blockip));  
   } 
 
   . 
   if(strcmp(inettoa(ciscop->ip.s_addr), "192.168.10.4") 
== 0) { 
    // Changed by the author in order to fit to add 
to LER1 the correct static route 
    snprintf(cnrmsg,sizeof(cnrmsg)-1,"%sip route %s 
255.255.255.255 t12\r",bd->block?"":"no ",inettoa(bd->blockip));  
   } 
   if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,cnrmsg,"#","at 
route command of ",cnrat)) 
   { flag=TRUE; 
    continue; 
   } 
 
   if(!moreinqueue(qp)) 
   { /* End input */ 
    if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,"\032","#","at 
CTRL-Z of ",cnrat)) 
    { flag=TRUE; 
     continue; 
    } 
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    //* Save config */ 
    // Ignored by the author in order to reduse 
each session's duration. We don't need permanently store the static 
routes. 
    //if(!sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,"write 
mem\r","#","at write mem command of ",cnrat)) 
    //{ flag=TRUE; 
    // continue; 
    //} 
 
    /* and we're outta here... */ 
    sendreceive(ciscop-
>routersocket,CNRNETWAIT,"cisconullroute",ciscop->ip,"quit\r","","at 
quit command of ",cnrat); 
    flag=TRUE; 
    //Changed by the author to FALSE in order to 
avoid continously keeping telnet session open. 
    ciscop->loggedin = FALSE;  
   } 
  }while(FALSE); 
 
  if(flag) 
  { closesocket(ciscop->routersocket); 
   ciscop->routersocket=0; 
   ciscop->routersocket=FALSE; 
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